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ABSTRACT

Quantifying the Impact
of the WTO on Kuwait
Reyadh Faras

The major contribution of this study is to quantify the economic impact of
Kuwait’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on supply, demand,
welfare and terms of trade. A general equilibrium international trade model is used to
obtain quantitative results. The model is theoretically static and based on the assumptions
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. However, it was estimated and
simulated dynamically.
After specifying the model theoretically it is estimated empirically by linearizing
the supply and demand equations that were obtained from solving the model analytically.
The estimated model is used in a number of simulation exercises in each one a given
agreement is analyzed and economic effects are measured.
The simulation exercises gave a number of results. First, the agreement on tariff
reduction has a very small (positive) effect on Kuwait because tariff rates are already
low, making any reductions to have insignificant effects. Second, the antidumping
agreement has a larger (negative) effect since it corresponds to higher increase in the
price of the importable good. Third, the decline in the world’s price of the importable
good as a result of globally implementing the WTO agreements has opposite effects but
of the same magnitude to those of the antidumping agreement. Finally, the agreement on
government procurement has the least effects since it increases exports only.
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CHAPTER (1)

INTRODUCTION

(1.1) SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The main purpose of this study is to quantify the economic impact of Kuwait’s
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The dissertation will measure the
possible effects to Kuwait of supply, demand, welfare and terms of trade as a result of the
multilateral trade liberalization agreements signed at the end of the Uruguay Round
which established the WTO on January 1, 1995. The WTO is expected to have significant
effects on prices and exports for an enormous number of goods and services.
The Kuwaiti economy is a good case to be analyzed because it is a small, open,
and developing economy. Therefore, it is interesting to see how it will respond to the
potential changes in international trade.
The significance of this dissertation is that it is the first study to assess and
quantify the effects of Kuwait’s membership in the WTO. The quantitative results are
important in guiding the government of Kuwait in its future trade policy initiatives. In
addition, the results may be useful to many developing countries with characteristics
similar to Kuwait’s economy, in particular countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC).
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(2.2) METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES
A general equilibrium international trade model is used to achieve the above
goals. The model is static and based on the assumptions of perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. The model describes the behavior of three representative
economic agents ( a household, a firm and a government) in a small open economy. The
firm produces two goods (using two factors: capital and labor) that it trades with a large
foreign country. The first is an importable (i.e. in excess demand) good which
corresponds to a bundle of manufactured goods (excludes capital goods, crude materials
and agricultural products). The second is an exportable (i.e. in excess supply) good that
represents a bundle of chemical goods. Thus, the excess supply and excess demand in the
home country create a motive for international trade between the two countries. The
government produces oil, which it exports to the foreign country, and produces services
that are consumed domestically. The household consumes goods and services using
income which comes from labor services supplied to the firm and the government and
interest income on endowment of capital stock.
The model is specified to incorporate some of the WTO agreements that have
direct effects on Kuwait. The first is the Multilateral Tariff Reduction Agreement which
requires WTO members to reduce their import tariffs by a given percentage during a
specified period. The second is the Antidumping Agreement which prohibits exporters
from selling their goods at a foreign market at prices less than those in the exporter’s
market. The third is the Government Procurement Agreement which prohibits
governments from favoring domestic suppliers to foreigners as a form of subsidizing
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domestic industries. The fourth is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. This agreement prohibits governments from subsidizing domestic producers in
a way that makes competition between domestic and foreign producers unfair. Finally, it
will explore the effect of the expected decline in the world prices as a result of
implementing the WTO agreements and the consequences of the reduction in trade
barriers.
After specifying the model theoretically, it is estimated empirically using real
annual data (in 1994 prices) for the period between 1969 and 1999. The main objective of
estimating the model is to offer a quantitative measure of the above agreements on the
Kuwaiti economy. The estimated model is used in conducting a number of simulation
exercises where a given agreement is analyzed and economic effects is measured. In each
simulation exercise the effects of the WTO is measured as the difference between the
simulated values obtained under the current trade regime and the simulated values under
a given agreement.
Finally, recommendations are made to assist the government and the private
sector in maximizing the net benefits of joining the WTO. In addition, it is shown that the
industrial sector needs to be restructured to make it more competitive in the new trade
environment which will provide new opportunities for exports by improving the access of
goods to the world market. On the other hand, this will impose new challenges by
increasing competition in both prices and qualities. For example, public firms have to be
privatized to increase their competitive ability and small firms have to be merged to take
advantage of economies of scale.

3

(1.3) ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized as follows. Chapter (2) reviews the literature on both trade
models and the WTO. The review includes a discussion of international trade theory,
theory of protection, general equilibrium models used in international trade literature,
welfare economics and the WTO literature. Chapter (3) presents the model that to be
used in estimation and simulation. The chapter consists of four sections: the model’s set
up and derivation of demand and supply functions; international trade and trade policy;
derivation of measures to quantify the economic effects of tariff’s agreement; and the
economic effects of other WTO agreements that have a direct effect on the economy of
Kuwait. Chapter (4) is divided into three main sections: discussion of the data that are
used and estimation technique; estimation of the demand and supply functions; and
estimation of the welfare effects of the current tariff regime. Chapter (5) is based on
simulations. It is divided into four main sections: analyzing the effects of Kuwait’s
enforcement of the tariff reduction agreement (assuming a reduction in import tariff rates
by 25%); analyzing the effects of enforcing the antidumping agreement (assuming an
increase in world prices of the importable good by 10%); analyzing the consequences of
enforcing all of the WTO agreements (assuming a reduction in world prices of the
importable good by 10%); and finally, analyzing the effects of enforcing the agreement
on government procurements (assuming that government purchases of domestic output
are reduced by 50%). Finally, chapter (6) presents the main conclusions of the study,
proposes possible extensions and makes recommendations to assist the government and
the private sector in maximizing the net benefits of joining the WTO.
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CHAPTER (2)

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the literature on both trade models and the WTO.
In section (2.1) a review of the international trade theory is conducted with an emphasis
on the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Section (2.2) is about the theory of protection where the
main trade policy instruments are discussed. Section (2.3) presents the main
characteristics of general equilibrium models that are commonly used in trade theory
literature. Section (2.4) reviews the literature on welfare economics and the alternative
measures of welfare loss of import tariffs and external shocks. Finally, section (2.5) gives
a thorough presentation of the WTO literature. In section (2.5.1) a brief history of the
WTO and the GATT is presented, while section (2.5.2) discusses some of the main
agreements of the WTO. Section (2.5.3) surveys the literature on the costs of protection
and the gains from the WTO and its effects on the world economy.
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(2.1) THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The origins of the theory of international trade go back to the early nineteenth
century with the publication of the famous book by David Ricardo (1817); The Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation. Ricardo built a trade model that he used to argue in
favor of free trade and for the removal of the so called “Corn Laws” that restricted
England’s imports of food. The model was based on the idea of comparative advantage
that arises from differences in labor productivity between countries. In the Ricardian
model, labor is the only factor used in production. Relative efficiency in production
results in specialization of each country in producing the goods in which it has a
comparative advantage.
However, dissatisfaction with the Ricardian model in explaining trends in
international trade as caused only by differences in labor productivity left trade theorists
searching for a more satisfactory theory. Two Swedish Economists advanced a theory of
international trade based on differences in resource abundance between countries.
Heckscher (1949) and Ohlin (1933) came up with a theory that suggests that countries
specialize in the production of goods that are intensive in a resource that is abundant in
that country. The model gained increasing popularity by subsequent developments
pioneered among others by Samuelson (1948). Since then, it has dominated the field of
international trade as a general equilibrium approach to analyze trade barriers
competitive markets.
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The Hickscher-Ohlin (H-O) model is used in this study as a tool for analyzing the
effects of changes in trade policy. What follows presents the set up and the main
assumptions underlying the model.
The main features of the (H-O) two country model are as follows. Each economy
is producing two goods (X and Y) using two factors of production (capital and labor) that
are perfectly mobile between the two sectors but internationally immobile. Factor
mobility is a cornerstone assumption in the model and is what distinguishes it from the
Ricardian model of specific-factors (Vousden, 1990). Production technologies are
identical across sectors and across countries. This implies that similar goods produced in
different countries are identical (i.e. perfect substitutes) and therefore, are sold at a
uniform price. In addition, the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale in
the production of both goods. Markets for outputs and inputs are competitive. Households
in the two countries have identical preferences and as a result, they have identical
demand schedules for the two goods. Each economy spends no more than its income (i.e.
expenditure equals income), which means that both countries have balanced trade (i.e.
exports equal imports). Finally, countries only differ by the relative availability of
resources. Resource availability is measured by the ratio of one input to the other (i.e.
capital / labor).
Equilibrium in the model is achieved when total supply and total demand are
equated, given the optimizing behaviors of the two representative economic agents. The
representative consumer is maximizing a static, utility function subject to a budget
constraint. The firm is maximizing profits subject to production technology. In the case
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of autarky (no trade) prices in the home country are determined where supply equals
demand. Graphically (no graph provided), this corresponds to the point of tangency
between the production possibilities curve and the “community’s” indifference curve at a
given price ratio.
With trade, however, prices are determined internationally by supply and demand
forces in world markets. The opening of the economy to trade changes the relative price
ratio and thus equilibrium (the tangency point) may differ from that of the autarky case.
At this new equilibrium, domestic supply of either good does not necessarily equal
demand. If the supply of a good, say X, exceeds domestic demand, then the excess supply
is exported. Conversely, if the domestic demand for the other good, say Y, exceeds
domestic supply, then the excess demand is imported. However, in total, where the
balanced trade assumption must be maintained, expenditure equals income. Therefore,
with trade, the economy can reach a higher indifference curve and be better off. In other
words, trade is welfare improving.
To complete the presentation of the H-O model, it is necessary to talk about the
issues of input prices, factor prices and factor intensity. First, a straightforward result
from microeconomic theory is that a rise in the price of an input reduces the demand for
that input by the two sectors. Second, a rise in the relative price of a product shifts
resources to its production and results in an increase in the return to the factor that it uses
intensively. This result is readily understood by noting that excess demand will occur for
the input used intensively in producing the good whose price has risen because fewer
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amounts of this input have been released from the other sector. This conclusion is known
as the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem:
A rise in the relative price of a good results in an increase in the real return of the input
used more intensively in its production and a decline in the real return to the other input.
Third, the issue of factor intensity has an essential role in the H-O model. As
stated earlier, an economy will specialize in the production of the good that uses an input
that is relatively abundant in that economy. This leads to an important theorem in the HO model, the Rybcznski’s Theorem. This theorem is stated as follows:
An increase in the endowment of one factor, ceteris paribus, increases the production of
the good that uses this factor more intensively and reduces the production of the other
good.

9

(2.2) THEORY OF PROTECTION
International trade theorists have made remarkable progress in advancing and
developing the theory of protection that explains, evaluates and quantifies economic
effects of trade barriers. Among the most influential Economists that advanced this
theory are Bhagwati, Corden, Kemp and Johnson. When trade barriers are mentioned, the
first thing that comes to mind is the import tariff. Tariffs are just one instrument that
countries use to influence the flow of trade in and out of their countries. Trade barriers
include an array of instruments that is discussed briefly below.
Import tariffs: Import tariffs are the oldest and most popular trade policy
instrument ever used. Countries commonly use tariffs to reach either or both of two
goals- raising government revenues, and protecting domestic industries from competition.
The former goal has lost its importance in the last century, as other sources of income
have become available to governments (e.g. domestic taxes on income, consumption, and
business). The latter, however, is still a popular policy instrument used by many countries
especially less developed countries (LDCs). Developed countries, on the other hand, have
reduced their reliance on tariffs for protection purposes but resorted to other policies that
is discussed below. Tariffs have the ability to distort the flow of international trade by
altering the relative prices facing consumers and producers, therefore deviating the
economy away from the pareto optimal equilibrium reached by free trade. In the next
chapter, section (3.2) discusses the effects of tariffs in greater detail.
Import quotas: In the second half of the last century, many developed countries
have reduced their reliance on tariffs in favor of import quotas. Import quotas have the
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same effects as tariffs because, when they are binding, they cause the relative price of the
importable good to increase. The only difference between the two, tariffs and quotas, is
that the foreign country is the only beneficiary of the price increase in the case of quotas,
while the government is the only beneficiary of the price increase in the case of tariffs.
Export subsidies: Export subsidies are aimed at promoting exports and are
common in both LDCs (e.g. subsidies to manufacturing exports) and developed countries
(e.g. subsidies to agricultural exports). These subsidies result in reducing export prices
and increasing the volume of exports (i.e. increasing competitiveness), while reducing
supply and increasing prices in the domestic market. One main difference between
export subsidies and import tariffs is that the former puts a fiscal burden on the
government/taxpayers, while the latter provides revenues.
Production subsidies: Production subsidies are intended to expand domestic
production and reduce imports of the importable good. These subsidies differ from export
subsidies by not distorting domestic prices and thus, not affecting domestic demand. One
more difference is that these subsidies apply to a larger volume of output and, as a result,
have a bigger fiscal burden.
The above are the main trade policy instruments used by governments to protect
their domestic industries. The welfare effects of these instruments is discussed in section
(2.4).
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(2.3) GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
International trade models in general and the Hickscher-Ohlin model in particular
use General Equilibrium (GE) models in explaining the flow in trade between countries
and measuring their effects on economies. The GE models are preferable to other models
such as partial equilibrium and macroeconometric models. Comparisons between the GE
model and its alternatives is presented in subsections (2.3.1 and 2.3.2) after discussing the
main features of the GE model below.
General equilibrium models were formalized by the work of Arrow and Debreu
(1954, 1959), Scarf (1967, 1973) and Arrow and Hahn (1971) and are based on Walras’
Law that all markets clear in equilibrium. Interaction between markets is the cornerstone
of GE models. Since the 1960s, GE models have become essential tools in two fields of
economics; public finance and international trade. In trade literature, GE models have
become, almost, the only tool in both single-country and multi-country models due to the
pioneering works of trade theorists, such as James Meade and Harry Johnson, in the
period between the fifties and the seventies.
A typical GE model consists of two sectors producing two goods using two
factors of production. The behavior of the economy is characterized by the behavior of
two representative agents, a household and a firm. Equilibrium is reached by the
optimizing behaviors of the two agents which results in equating demand to supply, due
to Walras’ Law. A major step was taken in the development of GE models by converting
the theoretical models into applied models that can be used empirically in evaluating
trade policies and external shocks. Applying GE models consists of three main stages. In
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the first, market structure and functional forms for utility and production functions are
specified, while in the second stage the model is solved numerically using actual data.
Because GE models are

large and nonlinear by nature, they are difficult to solve

analytically. Alternatively, a common technique used to solve GE models numerically is
called calibration. Calibration involves using one year’s data as a benchmark and
parameters are taken as given (from other studies), instead of estimating them within the
model as in macroeconometric models. These parameters are used to generate baseline
estimates that are used in the third stage in producing counterfactual estimates that reflect
policy changes or external shocks.
A more detailed discussion of GE models is presented in chapter (3) when the GE
model for this study is presented. The next two subsections will compare GE models with
two other popular models, partial equilibrium and macroeconometric models.

(2.3.1) GE MODELS VS. PARTIAL EQUILBRIUM MODELS
By definition, partial equilibrium (PE) models deal with more limited details of
the economy than general equilibrium models. A typical PE model is used in estimating
the effects of a change in one variable on another variable or on a few variables. In
contrast to a GE model, a PE model assumes that markets are segregated and therefore
ignores possible interactions between markets that may affect supply, demand and
relative prices. In addition, a GE model gives more reliable results than a PE model,
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which may yield erratic and approximate results (Whalley, 1975). In trade literature, the
use of a PE model in estimating the effects of a change in a trade policy (e.g. tariffs)
would underestimate the effects of the policy change since it ignores the effects on
relative prices that are more likely to affect supply, demand, real returns to factors of
production, and resource allocation ( Bandara, 1991).

(2.3.2) GE MODELS VS. MACROECONOMETRIC MODELS
Until the early 1970s, macroeconometric models have worked well and were
widely used. However, they lost their popularity in the mid seventies due to two main
factors. First, the period of stagflation during which these models performed poorly when
they were used to generate economic forecasts. The second factor was the criticism by
Robert Lucas (1976) who criticized macroeconometric models because of their lack of
microeconomic foundations. This was known as “Lucas Critique,” which simply states
that parameters estimated using macroeconometric models cannot be used for forecasting
the effects of future economic policies since the parameters will change when policy
changes, because economic agents will adjust their behavior given their expectations of
future policies.
Since then, GE models have gained much of their popularity because of their
strong theoretical foundations stemming from microeconomic theory. In other word, they
avoided the “Lucas Critique.” GE models also have the advantage of their flexibility to
be applied to most economic fields and in evaluating a large number of policy changes
and economic shocks.
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(2.4) WELFARE ECONOMICS
Mishan (1960, p.199) defines welfare economics as “that branch of study which
endeavors to formulate propositions by which we may rank, on the scale of better or
worse, alternative economic situations open to society”. The most important words in this
definition are better and worse. Welfare loss/gain is the main criterion by which we
evaluate a given project, tax system or trade policy. Welfare loss (also known in the
Public Finance literature as the excess burden) is the difference between the reduction in
consumption due to a public policy (e.g. tariff or tax) and what the government actually
collects. The tool commonly used in determining the welfare loss/gain is the consumer
surplus: the difference between what the consumer is willing to pay for a good and the
actual price paid. The consumer surplus can be defined in two ways. First, the
Marshallian consumer surplus corresponds, graphically, to the area to the left of the
uncompensated demand curve above the price. Second, the Hicksian consumer surplus
corresponds to the area to the left of the compensated demand curve above the price.
However, empirically the Marshallian consumer surplus is rarely used for two main
reasons. First, it is not derived from the consumer’s optimizing behavior (Auerbach and
Feldstein, 1985) and thus, lacks theoretical foundations (Martin, 1997). Second, it
provides only an approximation for the welfare effect (Martin, 1997). Therefore, it will
not be discussed in this study. The Hicksian consumer surplus is commonly derived from
general equilibrium models, this gives it the advantage of being a measure of the welfare
of all representative agents and takes into account feedbacks between the different
markets.
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This leaves us with the Hicksian surplus measures. Hicks (1942) has come up
with two measures of consumer surplus that are based on the compensated demand
function. This function is based on the idea that to keep the consumer’s utility constant,
income must change in a way that compensates him for the change in price (Varian,
1992). The first measure is the Compensating Variation (CV), which is defined as the
amount of income the consumer must receive to keep his utility unaffected by the price
change. The second measure is the Equivalent Variation (EV), which is defined as the
amount of income the consumer is willing to give up in order to avoid the change in
price. Because of their precise measure of consumer surplus, the EV and CV have
become the main tools used in the international trade literature in evaluating trade
policies, trade agreements and internal/external shocks [Harris (1984), Trela and Whalley
(1990), Brown and Whalley (1980), and Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle (1993)].
The CV and EV can be derived in two different ways that both give the same
measure of welfare in the absence of distortions (Martin, 1997). Interestingly, the two
approaches, also, depend on the expenditure function, E(P,U). The expenditure function
is defined as the minimum expenditure required to reach the level of utility (U) at the
given price (P). The expenditure function is widely used in public finance (for example:
Small and Rosen, 1980; Kay, 1980; Diamond and McFadden, 1974 and Dixit, 1975) and
in international trade (for example: Martin and Alston, 1994; Lloyd and Schweinberger,
1988 and Tyers and Falvey, 1989). The first approach is known as the balance of trade
function and the second is known as the direct welfare evaluation approach. Below is a
brief presentation of the two approaches based on Martin’s (1997) comparison of the two
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approaches. The derivation of the two approaches is saved for the next chapter (section
3.3) where we derive the welfare measures algebraically.

(2.4.1) THE BALANCE OF TRADE FUNCTION
The balance of trade approach is based on the balance of trade condition and can
be derived from the income-expenditure identity:
E(p,w,u) – R(p,w,v) – (p-p* ) Zp(p,w,v,u) - f = 0

(1)

Where E(p,w,u) is the expenditure function, R(p,w,v) is the national revenue function
(i.e. GDP), Zp(p,w,v,u) is imports (Zp=Ep-Rp) [subscript p is the derivative of Z with
respect to p], p* is world price, p is domestic price, w are factor prices, v are inputs and f
is net financial inflow from abroad.
The above identity states that expenditure (E(p,w,u)) must equal income (GDP +
tariff revenues + f ). This implies, as mentioned in section (2.1), that trade must be
balanced. The balance of trade function has the ability to incorporate a number of internal
and external distortions, in addition to tariffs, that have a direct effect on social welfare
(e.g. domestic taxes, changes in world prices, export subsidies and import quotas). Utility
in the income-expenditure identity is endogenous, while prices, resource endowments (v)
and financial inflow (f) are exogenous.
Following Anderson and Neary (1992), the balance of trade function can be
derived from equation (1) by assuming that utility is exogenous and by adding a new
term (B) that measures the additional (f) that keeps the level of utility fixed:
Bi (p,p*,w,v,ui) = Z(p,w,v,ui) – (p – p*) Zp(p,v,ui) – f
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(2)

In equation (2), (ui) can be defined either as the initial level of the exogenous
utility if we use the Compensating Variation measure or as the final level of utility if the
Equivalent Variation measure is used. Thus, (Bi) is defined as a measure of welfare
change at (ui) and can be used to find both CV and EV of a change in world price from
p0* to p1*.
CV: B10 – B00 = B[p1,w1,p1*,v,u0] – B[p0,w0,p0*,v,u0]
= B[p1,w1,p1*,v,u0]

(3)

because B[p0,w0,p0*,v,u0] = 0 by equation (1).

EV: B11 – B01 = B[p1,w1,p1*,v,u1] – B[p0,w0,p0*,v,u1]
= - B[p0,w0,p0*,v,u1]

(4)

because B[p1,w1,p1*,v,u1] = 0 by equation (1).
The two measures above provide an exact measure of compensation required to
keep utility fixed at (ui) as a result of a change in either world price, domestic price or
tariff rates. However, Anderson and Martin (1995) show that the EV measure has the
advantage of providing a money metric measure in addition to the compensation
measure, while the CV provides only the latter. This makes the EV widely used in
empirical studies in general and studies evaluating the welfare effects of the WTO in
particular.
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(2.4.2) DIRECT WELFARE EVALUATION
An alternative measure of welfare change that is commonly used in general
equilibrium models is the direct money metric measure that can be obtained from the
expenditure and utility functions specified in GE models. Similar to the balance of trade
function approach, the direct money metric approach can be used to get a measure of
welfare in the form of either the equivalent variation or the compensating variation.
Both measures, EV and CV, are specified as the difference between the
expenditure functions evaluated at the initial prices, as in the EV, or at the new prices, as
in the CV:
EV = E (p0, u0) – E (p0, u1)

(5)

CV = E (p1, u0) – E (p1, u1)

(6)

The above measures can be directly estimated from the household optimization
problem as follows. First, minimize the expenditure of the household subject to keeping
its utility fixed at a given level. This gives the Hicksian (compensated) demand functions.
Second, plug these demand functions into the budget constraint, this gives the
expenditure function.
Since both measures, EV and CV, use different prices in evaluating welfare
change, we expect their estimates not to be exact but at the same time there won’t be a
big difference between them. However, choosing either measure is of some importance
and depends on the objectives of the researcher. Varian (1992) explains that if the goal is
to provide a compensation scheme at new prices, then the CV is the appropriate choice,
while if the goal is to obtain a measure of the willingness to pay, then the EV is more
appropriate. Moreover, Varian argues in favor of the EV for two reasons. First, it is much
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easier to make decisions about proposed policies based on actual prices than hypothetical
prices. Second, in the case of comparing more than one policy change, the EV keeps
prices fixed at the status quo, while the CV uses different base prices for each policy.
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(2.5) THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)
Since the main objective of this study is to measure the economic effects of the
WTO agreements, it is necessary to give an overview of the main issues surrounding the
WTO. In this section we emphasize three issues that are discussed in the next three
subsections.

(2.5.1) HISTORY OF THE WTO
Three historical factors have participated in the creation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which preceded the WTO. First, the
recognition by the world leaders that mistakes in economic policy during the interwar
period (1920-1940) have, among other reasons, led to World War II (Jackson, 1998).
Second, the passage of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act that allowed the United
States’ (hereafter US) President to enter into trade agreements to reduce tariffs. Under
this act, the US has signed 32 bilateral tariff reduction agreements by 1945. Drafts of
these agreements have become the underlying versions of the GATT agreements. Finally,
the Bretton Woods conference, which was held in 1944 and established the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, has recognized the need for an international
institution for trade to accompany the monetary institutions.
The first meeting of the GATT was held in Geneva in 1947 under the leadership
of the US and its allies (22 countries) to achieve two goals. First, discussing reciprocal
agreements for tariff reductions and second to prepare for the creation of a new
international trade institution that was to be called the International Trade Organization
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(ITO). Nevertheless, the refusal of the US Congress to pass a bill creating the ITO has
prevented it from being established. Instead negotiations were carried out under the
GATT as a treaty, not an institution. Since then, eight negotiating rounds were held
between 1947 and 1994. The last round, the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), was the most
successful one in terms of the number of participants (120 countries) and the scope and
number of agreements reached (24 agreements). Table (22) in Appendix (3) presents the
eight rounds and the volume of trade covered under each one. For example, trade covered
by negotiations has tremendously increased from $2.5 billion in the first round to
$3,700.00 billion in the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay round agreements were signed in
Marrakesh in April 1994 and entered into force in January 1995 with the creation of the
WTO. The main difference between the GATT and the WTO is the institutional charter
of the latter, which gives it the authority to enforce the signed agreements.

(2.5.2) THE WTO AGREEMENTS
Earlier agreements reached by GATT negotiating rounds covered tariff reduction
in trade in goods only, but the Uruguay round agreements covered new areas of trade,
protection policies, environment, intellectual property rights, health and dispute
settlement procedures. Table (23) in Appendix (4) summarizes all the agreements. Below
is a brief discussion of some of the most important agreements.
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1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
This agreement replaced the original agreement of the GATT that was signed in
1947. However, the new agreement has carried out most of the provisions of the old
agreement, the main concern of which was tariff reduction. The new agreement required
tariff reduction by 36% (24%) by developed (developing) countries over a ten (fifteen)
year period.
2. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
This agreement was a great achievement for developing countries producing
textiles and clothing. Since 1974, textile exports from developing countries to developed
countries were constrained by a system of quota restrictions enforced by the Multifibre
Arrangement (MFA). This agreement requires a gradual removal of the MFA over a ten
year period. The significance of this agreement is that it improves the market access for
exports from developing countries that have a comparative advantage in producing
textiles and clothing, which is a labor intensive industry.
3. The Agreement on Agriculture
Agriculture was a new area of trade in the Uruguay round. The agriculture
agreement was also an achievement for developing countries exporting agricultural
products because it improved their access to developed countries’ markets. The
agreement has four main features. First, reduction in import tariffs similar to that of
manufactured goods. Second, a reduction in export subsidies by the same percentages as
import tariffs and a reduction in domestic support by 20% (13%) for developed
(developing) countries. Third, market access commitments were set at 3% of domestic
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consumption at the beginning of the implementation period and to be increased to 5% by
the year 2000 (2004) for developed (developing) countries. Finally, all non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) have to be converted into tariff equivalents.
4. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
This agreement prohibits government’s financial contributions to a specific firm,
industry or region that give them an advantage over foreign suppliers. These
contributions (subsidies) fall into two categories. Export subsidies based on export
performance and import substitution subsidies are based on the use of domestic goods
instead of imports. The reason for the prohibition of subsidies is because they put
domestic (subsidized) and foreign goods at an unfair competition.
5. The Antidumping Agreement
According to the WTO (1999a p.80) definition, dumping is “the sale of an
exported product in a foreign market at a price below that at which the same product is
usually sold in its home market”. Unlike subsidies, dumping is performed by individual
firms, this makes it difficult to be monitored, controlled or enforced by agreements
between governments (WTO,1999a). The enforcement of this agreement requires two
conditions: a proof of dumping and a proof of injury to domestic industry. If these two
conditions were met, then the affected country may take one or more of the following
measures: impose an antidumping duty, take provisional antidumping measures, or settle
the price issue voluntarily by asking the exporter to revise its price.
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6. The Agreement on Trade in Services
This is the first agreement in services that was reached by the eight GATT
negotiation rounds and it is considered the major development in GATT history. The
agreement covers 150 different forms of services. These services are divided into 12
sectors among which are: financial services, telecommunications, transportation, health,
education, tourism, and construction/engineering services.
7. The Agreement on Government Procurement
This agreement covers government purchases of goods and services. It prohibits
governments from using their purchases as a mean of supporting domestic producers and
discriminating against foreign suppliers. It should be noted that this agreement is one of
the four voluntary agreements (known as “Plurilateral Agreements”) and applies only to
members who choose to sign it.

(2.5.3) EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
This subsection reviews review the empirical literature on the costs of protection
and the gains from trade liberalization. An overview of the costs and benefits of trade
policies is important in guiding an understanding of the gains from implementing the
WTO agreements when the empirical findings are presented in chapter five. Subsection
(2.5.3.1) presents a summary of empirical results of the negative effects of protectionist
policies in some of the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Subsection (2.5.3.2) presents empirical results of studies that
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were conducted in the 1990s to assess the potential gains from implementing the
agreements that were signed by the end of the Uruguay round in 1994.

(2.5.3.1) THE COSTS OF PROTECTION
Three survey studies by Feenstra (1992), Hufbauer (1996) and the OECD (1998)
provide an overall and detailed estimate of the costs of protection in OECD countries.
Costs were expressed in terms of higher prices, costs of subsidies and costs of protecting
jobs in the protected sectors of the economy. First, we present the OECD survey results
of the costs of higher prices and subsidies in table (1).

Year

Country

Sector

1979-1989

EU

Sugar

ECU 3 billion/Year

1988

US

Sugar

US $ 3 billion/Year

1995

Japan

Agriculture

US $ 49.3 billion/Year

1994

OECD

Late 1980s

US

1970s

UK

Clothing

UK £ 500 million

1970s

Canada

Clothing

C $ 780 million

1981-1984

US

Automobiles

41% higher price

1989

France

Agriculture
Textiles-Clothing

Cars

Table (1): Costs of protection in some OECD countries
Source: OECD (1998)
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Costs

US $ 350 billion
US $ 27 billion

US $ 1.7 billion

The estimates of the costs of protectionist policies in some sectors of the economy
are relatively significant and can be avoided if trade barriers are removed. These costs
correspond to price increases and costs of subsidies only. Moreover, these estimates are
for developed countries who, on average, have much lower tariff rates than LDCs. It is
expected that these costs are much higher in LDCs and that their consumers will gain
from lower prices, higher qualities and wider diversity. Thus, trade liberalization
agreements under the WTO umbrella are expected to have significant effects on social
welfare in the protected countries.
The survey by Feenstra (1992) of nine studies shows the sectoral costs of
protection to the US economy. The estimates of these costs are presented in table (2).

(billion 1985 dollars)
Sector

Automobiles
Dairy

US DWL

Quota Rents

0.2 – 1.2

2.2 – 7.9

1.4

0.25

0.02
0.1

Steel

0.1 – 0.3

0.7 –2.0

Textile & Apparel

4.9 – 5.9

4.0 – 6.1

Average tariffs

1.2 – 3.4

Total

7.9 – 12.3

0
7.3 – 17.3

Foreign DWL

0–3

4 – 15.5
n.a.
4.3 – 18.8

Table (2): Costs of Protection in the US
Source: Feenstra (1992)
The first column, US DWL, presents estimates of the dead weight loss incurred
by the US economy due to the presence of protectionist measures taken by the
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government to protect the four sectors displayed in the table. The total DWL to the US
economy ranges between $7.9 billion and $12.3 billion.
The second column, Quota Rents, presents estimates of rents earned by foreign
countries exporting to the US due to measures taken by the US to limit imports from
these countries. These measures include import quotas and voluntary export restraints.
These rents are ranging between $7.3 billion and $17.3 billion.
Finally, the third column presents estimates of the dead weight loss incurred by
foreign countries exporting to the US. Since these numbers are positive, this means that
quota rents earned by foreigners are more than offset by losses that foreigners incur due
to the existence of protectionist measures by the US. These losses are between $4.3
billion and $18.8 billion.
Next, we present estimates of the costs of job protection in a number of OECD
countries. These costs are presented in table (3).
The estimates in table (3) show how costly it is to save jobs in protected sectors
producing tradable goods. It is clear that the countries surveyed is much better off, in
terms of social welfare, if protection were eliminated. The gains from removing job
protection range from 1.1% to 4.3% of GDP, which is clearly significant. One reason for
the continuous protection of jobs in domestic industries, at high costs, is the strong
lobbying that these industries have in influencing trade policies in their countries.
Therefore, under the WTO agreements, governments around the world would be more
constrained in responding to pressures from interest groups that push for more
protection.
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US

Year

1994

Industries Surveyed

21

Japan

Korea

EU

1989

1990

1990

47

49

20

Consumer Cost:
Billions of $

70

75-110

12-13

97-100

Share of GDP

1.2

2.6-3.8

3.8-4.3

1.1-1.6

Equivalent (%)

35

180

170

Jobs Saved (000)

190

180

174-405

Cost per Job (000$)

70

600

33- 67

Average Tariff
40
1,500
70

Table (3): cost of saving jobs in some OECD countries
Source: Hufbauer (1996)
(2..5.3.2) THE GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION
The Uruguay round has witnessed an unprecedented success evaluated by the
number of agreements, especially the new areas covered by the agreement such as
agriculture, textiles and clothing, services, intellectual property rights and trade related
investment measures. Also the creation of the WTO as the most powerful international
economic institution ever created. Moreover, the Uruguay round resulted in significant
reductions in tariffs on industrial goods. All of these achievements raised the question:
how much gains can be expected from the new trading system? To answer this question,
dozens of studies were conducted by several international institutions (e.g. WTO, OECD,
and World Bank), and by academics.
The main tool that most of the studies used is the Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model. Most of the models assume perfect competition and constant
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returns to scale, while others consider cases of imperfect competition and economies of
scale. Some are static and others dynamic in that the increase in income due to
liberalization increases savings and investment, which in turn increases income in the
future. Below is a discussion of some of the widely cited studies that aimed to quantify
the effects of the WTO (or the Uruguay round).
According to a survey of fourteen studies about the effects of the WTO, Perroni
(1998) found a wide range of model specifications that significantly affected the results.
More conservative estimates were obtained from static models assuming perfect
competition and constant returns to scale, while the highest estimates were obtained from
dynamic models assuming imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. For
example, Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom (1994) results ranged between $51 billion
and $291 billion or 0.31%-1.36% of world GDP, depending on model specification.
Another study by Goldin, Kudson and Mensbrugghe (1993) gives estimates of $48 billion
for starting from a case of full employment, while the estimates increase to $235 billion
for starting from unemployment. The gains were divided between developed and
developing countries as follows: $ (32-16 and 179-56) billion, respectively. Overall,
Perroni concluded that the estimates of the surveyed studies are between 0.1% to 1.5%
of the world GDP.
Another survey by the WTO (1999) shows that the world income will increase by
1% annually. This translates to $250 billion to $350 billion by 2005. Also studies show
significant growth in world trade by 5.7% (Francois et al, 1994), 20.2% ( Nguyen,
Perroni and Wigle, 1993), and even by 59% (Hertel, Martin, Yanagishima and
Dimaranan, 1996).

30

Overall, the results show that developed countries will get the biggest share of the
welfare gain. This gain will accrue to consumers in developed countries who will enjoy
lower prices. Results for other countries depend on their elasticities of exports and
imports and on their being net exporters or net importers. Goldin et al (1993) found that
African countries will lose slightly by (-0.3%) of GDP, while other LDCs in South-East
Asia and Latin America will enjoy a gain of 1-2% of GDP.
Finally, the estimates of the effects of the WTO are less than what was expected
given the number of WTO members and the wide range of trade topics covered by the
agreements. These estimates suggest that the effects of the WTO agreements were
underestimated empirically for a number of reasons. First, the effects of some agreements
were impossible to quantify. For example, the intellectual property rights agreement,
trade related investment measures agreement, and safeguards agreement. Second, even if
an agreement is quantifiable, reliable data do no exist. For example, the agreement on
trade in services. Finally, most of the studies ignore the agreement on services, for lack of
data, but a study by Brown et al (1996) found that the gains from liberalization of trade in
services are of the same magnitude as those of goods liberalization.
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(2.6) THE ECONOMY OF KUWAIT
In this section, the economy of Kuwait is described briefly using economic data.
The objective is to give an overview of the economy in terms of the composition of GDP,
main economic sectors, international trade patterns and a summary of economic
indicators used in this study.
Kuwait is a small country located on the Northwest shore of the Persian Gulf. The
population of Kuwait as of the year 2000 is 2.2 million of which 63% are foreign. The
currency of Kuwait is the Kuwaiti Dinar, which equals $3.3 US. Kuwait’s main source of
income comes from oil exports. For example, oil revenues accounted for 91.5% of total
government’s revenues during the fiscal year 1999/2000. Moreover, Kuwait’s reserves of
oil account for 9.3% of the world reserves. The government controls the oil industry,
public utilities, telecommunications, transportation, chemical industry and some
manufacturing enterprises.

(2.6.1) GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Kuwait is concentrated in two sectors:
crude oil production and services. Crude oil sector accounted for 46.4% of total GDP
during the period 1969-1999, while the service sector accounted for 39.7%. The third
largest sector is the refined oil sector, which accounted for 6.8%. In an effort to reduce the
reliance on the oil industry, the government of Kuwait conducted a national development
plan in the 1960s and 1970s, but no diversification was attained until recently and oil
continues to be the main source of economic activity. The two sectors that the government
aims at promoting are the chemical industry and manufacturing, which account for 0.7%
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and 2.8% of GDP, respectively. Table (4) below shows the eight components of GDP and
their share in total GDP during the 1969-1999 period.

GDP
Average

% of
GDP

Agric.

Chemi.

C. Oil

Const.

Manuf.

Serv.

R. Oil

5051.6

21.4

37.8

2343.3

160.9

141.0

2004.5

342.7

100

0.4

0.7

46.4

3.2

2.8

39.7

6.8

Where: Agric. is Agriculture and Fishery, Chemi. is chemical, C. Oil is crude oil, Const. is
Construction, Mnuf. is manufacturing, Serv. is services, and R. Oil is refined oil.

Table (4): Components of GDP
(2.6.2) INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Kuwait has an open economy in which exports and imports in 1999 accounted for
47% and 37% of GDP, respectively. In 1999, oil exports accounted for 90% of total
exports, while chemicals accounted for 6%, machinery for 1.3% and manufactured
exports for 1%. Because chemical exports are the second largest category of exports after
oil, they will be specified in this study as the exportable good (X). Chemical exports are
composed of the following: fertilizers, plastic, inorganic chemicals, essential oils and
cleansing materials.
The composition of imports during the period 1969-1999 was as follows: capital
goods 40%, manufactured goods 36.5%, food 14.7% and crude materials 8%. Under the
current customs’ regime, food, capital goods and crude materials enter Kuwait duty free.
Only manufactured goods (other than capital goods) are taxed at a 4% tariff rate,
therefore they will be specified in this study as the importable good (Y). Manufactured
goods include the following products: leather, wood, paper, textiles and metals.
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Kuwait trades with a large number of countries. Trade partners differ according to
the direction of trade (i.e. exports vs. imports) and good categories. Excluding oil,
Kuwait’s non-oil exports go mainly to Asian markets, which account for 81.6%. About
one third of Kuwait’s exports go to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
while 13.3% go to India, 11.2% Arab countries (excluding GCC countries), 6.2% to
china, 6.2% the EU and 4.7% to the US. Table (5) provides a summary of destinations of
Kuwait’s exports as an average for the period 1995-1999.

Country
GCC Countries
India
Arab Countries
China
Other Asians
E. U.
USA

% of Total Exports
33.0
13.3
11.2
6.20
24.0
6.20
4.70

Table (5): Destinations of Non-Oil Exports
Kuwait’s imports are more diversified than exports and come from three
important groups of countries. Asian countries account for the largest portion with a share
of 42%. Main Asian exporters are Japan 12.3%, India 3.4 and China 2.7%. The European
Union’s share is 34.3%, while the US’s share is 14.8%. Table (6) provides a summary of
the main sources of Kuwait’s imports during the period 1995-1999.

34

Country

% of Total Imports

E. U.
USA
Japan
Other Asians
GCC Countries
India
Arab Countries
China

34.3
14.8
12.3
12.0
10.0
3.4
2.8
2.7

Table (6): Sources of Imports
(2.6.3) SUMMARY OF THE DATA
In this subsection, a summary of the data of the exportable good (X) and the
importable good (Y) is provided to assist the reader in understanding the results that are
to be obtained from the empirical analysis in chapters four and five. The summary covers
imports, exports, demand for capital and labor and production. All statistics are specified
as percentages of non-oil GDP and the totals of the same category. Table (7) provides this
summary for the period 1969-1999.

Category

Percentage Rate (%)

Imports of (Y) / Total Imports
Imports of (Y) / Non-Oil GDP
Exports of (X) / Total Exports
Exports of (X) / Non-Oil Exports
Exports of (X) / Non-Oil GDP
Capital in Sector (X) / Total Capital
Capital in Sector (Y) / Total Capital
Labor in Sector (Y) / Labor Force
Labor in Sector (X) / Labor Force
Production of (X) / Non-Oil GDP
Production of (Y) / Non-Oil GDP

36.5
19.0
1.60
18.6
1.50
3.10
2.30
5.00
0.40
3.00
11.6

Table (7): Summary of Data
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CHAPTER (3)

THE MODEL

INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the model that is used in chapters four and five in estimation
and simulation, respectively. The chapter consists of four main sections and a number of
subsections. Section (3.1) presents the model’s set up and derive demand and supply
functions for both output and production factors. This section, for simplicity, does not
introduce trade policy. Trade policy is introduced in section (3.2), while section (3.3)
derives measures to quantify the economic effects of tariffs’ agreement. Finally, section
(3.4) discusses the economic effects of other WTO agreements that have a direct effect
on the economy of Kuwait.
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(3.1) THE MODEL
This is a two-sector general equilibrium trade model for a small open economy. It
is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. The economy produces two goods (X and
Y) using two factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L). The home country has an
excess supply of good (X) that it exports to the foreign country. Thus, good (X) is the
exportable good. The home country has an excess demand for good (Y) that is met by
imports from the foreign country. Thus, good (Y) is the importable good. Therefore,
excess supply and excess demand of each good creates the need for the home country to
engage in trade with the foreign country. The home country is modeled as a small country
while the foreign country is a large country, e.g. the rest of the world. This makes the
home country a price taker and the foreign country a price setter. The emphasis of the
model is on the home country.
An important assumption in the H-O model is that goods produced in different
countries are perfect substitutes (i.e. homogenous goods), which means that they are sold
at one price. This assumption implies that a good can be either imported or exported, but
not exported and imported at the same time (Hatta and Fukushima, 1979). In other words,
there is no two way trade. This is in contrast with the Armington Assumption that goods
produced in different countries are imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969). This violates
the small country assumption for the following reason: if domestic and imported goods
can be differentiated, this means that they must be sold at different prices, which implies
that the small country has an influence on its terms of trade (i.e. relative prices). This
contradicts the assumption that the small country is a price taker.

37

The behavior of economic agents in the home country is modeled by the
behavior of three representative agents: a household, a firm and a government. The
preferences of the household are characterized by a Cobb- Douglas utility function. The
objective of the household is to maximize its utility function subject to a budget
constraint. The firm’s technology is characterized by a constant returns to scale CobbDouglas production function. The firm’s objective is to minimize the costs of production
(= maximize profit) for a given quantity of output. Finally, the government’s objective is
to keep its budget balanced by equating its total revenues coming from oil exports and
import tariffs to its transfer payments to households and costs of producing public
services. The latter include hiring domestic labor in the service sector and buying goods
necessary for the production of services from domestic producers. One more detail, in
addition to trade in goods (X and Y), the home country exports oil to the foreign country
and imports capital goods from the latter.
The model that is derived in the first four subsections consists of (12) equations
describing the behavior of the three representative agents in the home country. There are
eight behavioral equations (two for the household and six for the firm) and four identities.
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(3.1.1) THE FIRM
The firm operates in perfectly competitive markets for goods and factors of
production. It produces two homogenous goods (X and Y) using two factors; capital and
labor. Both factors can be perfectly mobilized between the production of the two goods.
The firm’s objective is to maximize profits which implies minimizing costs (Varian,
1992). The production technology is characterized by a constant returns to scale CobbDouglas function with two factors; capital and labor:
FY(KY,NY) = LβY K1-βY

and

FX(KX,NX) = LδX K1-δX .

The total cost function (TC) consists of the costs of hiring labor and the costs of
acquiring capital:
TC i (w, r, Q i) = w L i + r K i
where i = X, Y
Labor costs equal the number of workers hired multiplied by the real wage rate.
Capital costs equal the stock of capital used multiplied by the rental price of capital,
which equals the net real interest rate. This means that factors of production are paid their
value marginal product. This is due to the assumption of perfect competition (i.e. zero
economic profits).
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The solution to the problem involves expressing all the endogenous variables as
functions of output prices and factor endowments (Pi , L, K). The following steps is
followed in solving the problem. First I will solve the problem for good (Y) and then for
good (X).
1. State the minimization problem
Min. TC Y (w, r, Q Y) = w L Y + r K Y
Subject to Q Y = LβY K1-βY
The lagrangian of the problem is:
£ Y = w L Y + r K Y + λ (Q Y - LβY K1-βY )

2. Finding the first order conditions with respect to labor and capital.
∂£Y /∂ L Y : w - λ β Lβ-1Y K1-βY = 0
∂£Y /∂ KY : r - λ (β-1) LβY K-βY = 0

3. Finding the cost function
After solving the first order conditions for KY and LY , we plug them in the cost
function:
TC Y (w, r, Q Y) = Q Y [ wβ (r -1 (1-β)/ β) β-1 + r1-β (w (1-β)/ β)β ]
= Q Y A wβ r1-β
Where (A) = ((1-β)/β)β-1 + ((1-β)/β)β
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4. Finding the marginal cost
First find the first order condition of the cost function with respect to output. Then,
equate it to the price of output (PY) (i.e. because of the assumption of perfect
competition).
PY = MCY = ∂ TCY / ∂ QY = A wβ r1-β
After finding the price equation for good (Y), follow the steps 1-4 to find the price
equation for good (X), which has the following form:
PX = MCX = ∂ TCX / ∂ QX = Z wδ r1- δ
Where (Z) = ((1-δ)/δ)δ-1 + ((1-δ)/δ)δ

5. Solving the price equations for the wage rate and the interest rate.
The two price equations are functions of two unknowns (w and r), so it is easy to
solve for (w and r) simultaneously in terms of prices (PX and PY):
r = (PY A-1 ) δ/(δ -β) (PX Z –1 )-β/(δ -β)
w = (PX Z-1 ) 1-β/(δ -β) (PY A-1 ) δ -1/(δ -β)

6. Specifying the revenue function
Specify the “firm’s” revenue function and then find the first order conditions with
respect to prices. This gives output (due to Hotelling’s Lemma) as a function of output
prices and factor endowments ( PX , PY , L, K ). Because of the zero profit condition
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implied by the perfect competition assumption, revenues (R) equal costs:
R = w (LY + LX) + r (K Y + KX )
R= (PX Z-1 ) 1-β/(δ -β) (PY A-1 )δ -1/(δ -β) (LY + LX) + (PY A-1 ) δ/(δ -β) (PX Z –1 )-β/(δ -β) (KY +KX)
Qi = (∂ w / ∂ Pi) (LY + LX) + (∂ r / ∂ Pi) (LY + LX)
Q Y = ∂ R / ∂ PY = ((δ -1)/δ -β) (PX Z-1 ) 1-β/(δ -β) (PY A-1 ) β-1/(δ -β) A-1 (LY + LX)
+ (δ/(δ -β)) (PY A-1 ) β/(δ -β) A -1 (PX Z –1 )-β/(δ -β) (KY +KX)
Q X = ∂ R / ∂ PX = ((1-β)/δ -β) (PX Z-1 ) 1- δ/(δ -β) Z -1 (PY A-1 ) δ -1/(δ -β) (LY + LX)
– (β/(δ -β)) (PY A-1 ) δ/(δ -β) (PX Z –1 )- δ/(δ -β) Z-1 (KY +KX)
The above equations can be used to solve for the demand for labor and capital
functions. This is done by substituting the above equations, the wage rate (w) and the
interest rate (r) equations into the total cost function which gives demand equations in
terms of output prices and factor endowments:
LY = ∂ TCY / ∂ w = Q Y ( PX , PY , L, K ) [β w (PX , PY ) r (PX , PY ) A ]
KY = ∂ TCY / ∂ r = Q Y ( PX , PY , L, K ) [(1-β) w (PX , PY ) r (PX , PY ) A ]
LX = ∂ TCX / ∂w = Q X ( PX , PY , L, K ) [δ w (PX , PY ) r (PX , PY ) Z ]
KX = ∂ TCX / ∂ r = Q X ( PX , PY , L, K ) [(1-δ) w (PX , PY ) r (PX , PY ) Z ]
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Comparative Statics
The following analysis utilizes the properties of the revenue function and is based
on Dixit and Norman (1980).
The revenue function is defined as: R (PX , PY, K, L).
The derivatives of the revenue function with respect to prices give the supply functions,
R1 = QX (PX , PY, K, L)
R2 = QY (PX , PY, K, L)
Due to the convexity of R in P,
R11 ≥ 0

(1)

R22 ≥ 0

(2)

Moreover, because Ri is homogeneous of degree zero in P, Euler’s Theorem can be used
to sign Rij ,
Ri = Ri (PX , PY, K, L)
0 = R11 PX + R12 PY

(3)

0 = R21 PX + R22 PY

(4)

The first term on the right hand side in (3) is non-negative due to the convexity of
the revenue function in prices. The second term has to be non-positive in order for the
identity to hold. Thus, R12 is non-positive. For R2, the second term in (4) has to be nonnegative due to the convexity of the revenue function, thus the first term has to be nonpositive for the identity to hold, which means that R21 is non-negative.
The signs of the derivatives of R1 and R2 with respect to (K and L) depend on the
intensity of factors used in the production of each good. According to Rybcznski’s
Theorem, an increase in the endowment of a factor of production increases the output of
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the good that uses this factor intensively and reduces production of the other good. In the
case of good (Y), which is labor intensive,
R23 < 0

(5)

and
R24 > 0,

(6)

while in the case of good (X), which is capital intensive,
R13 > 0

(7)

and
R14 < 0

(8)
Next, the derivatives of the revenue function with respect to factors of production

can be used to obtain the returns to these factors.
R3 = r (PX , PY, K, L)
R4 = w (PX , PY, K, L)
Utilizing the Samuelson-Stolper Theorem, which states that an increase in the
price of a good increases the return to the factor of production that is used intensively in
its production and reduces the return to the other input, the effects of changes in output
prices on the returns to factors of production can be obtained. For example, because good
(X) is capital intensive, then an increase in its price increases the return to capital (r) and
reduces the return to labor (w). Th opposite is true for good (Y), which is labor intensive.
R31 ≥ 0

(9)

R42 ≥ 0

(10)

R32 ≤ 0

(11)

R41 ≤ 0

(12)
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Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the cost function is
homogeneous of degree one,
C (w, r, y) = y (w, r, 1)
Average cost (AC) = C (w, r, 1)
Moreover, under perfect competition, price equals average cost and marginal cost.
Thus,
PX = CX (w, r, 1)
PY = CY (w, r, 1)
Where Ci is the marginal cost with respect Qi. But since (w and r) were shown (in
section 3.1.1) to be functions of (PX and PY), the above equations can be rewritten as
follows:
w = w (PX , PY)
r = r (PX , PY)
∂w/∂L= 0

(13)

∂w/∂K=0

(14)

∂r/∂L = 0

(15)

∂r/∂K = 0

(16)

Because (w and r) are homogeneous of degree zero in (L and K). This result is valid only
in the H-O model, not in general.
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Linearization
The supply functions (Qi) are reduced-form equations that can be rewritten using
the implicit function theorem as follows:
QX = F ( PY , PX , L , K )
QY = F ( PY , PX , L , K )
Using the above specifications, the two equations can be estimated as follows:
Note: a number in parenthesis next to an expected sign corresponds to the number
of an equation in the comparative static subsection from which the sign was obtained.
QX = φ0 + φ1 PX + φ2 PY + φ3 K + φ4 L + e
Expected Signs: φ1 ≥ 0 (1), φ2 ≤ 0 (3), φ3 > 0 (7) and φ4 <0 (8).
QY = ϕ0 + ϕ1 PX + ϕ2 PY + ϕ3 K + ϕ4 L + e
Expected Signs: ϕ1 ≤ 0 (4), ϕ2 ≥ 0 (2), ϕ3 <0 (5) and ϕ4 >0 (6).
Where (e ) is an error term.
Similarly, the demand for factors of production (Li and Ki) can be rewritten using
the implicit function theorem as follows:
LY = G ( PY , PX , L , K )
KY = G ( PY , PX , K , L )
LX = G ( PY , PX , K , L )
KX = G ( PY , PX , K , L )
Using the above specifications, the four equations can be estimated as follows:
LY = ξ0 + ξ1 PX + ξ2 PY + ξ3 K + ξ4 L + e
Expected Signs: ξ1≤ 0 (12), ξ2 ≥ 0 (10), ξ3 ≤ 0 (R. Them.) and ξ4 ≥ 0 (R. Them).
Note: R. Them. is Rybcznski’s Theorem.
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KY = µ0 + µ1 PX + µ2 PY + µ3 K + µ4 L + e
Expected Signs: µ1 ≤ 0 (9), µ2 ≥ 0 (11), µ3 ≤ 0 (R. Them.) and µ4 ≥ 0 (R Them).
LX = Ω0 + Ω1 PX + Ω2 PY + Ω3 K + Ω4 L + e
Expected Signs: Ω1 ≥ 0 (12), Ω2 ≤ 0 (10), Ω3 ≥ 0 (R. Them.) and Ω4 ≤ 0 (R. Them).
KX = θ0 + θ1 PX + θ2 PY + θ3 K + θ4 L + e
Expected Signs: θ1 ≥ 0 (9), θ2 ≤ 0 (11), θ3 ≥ 0 (R. Them.) and θ4 ≤ 0 (R. Them.).
Where (e ) is an error term.
Note: Qi and Ki are in real terms since they were derived from optimization behavior.
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(3.1.2) THE HOUSEHOLD
In the model, a representative household is maximizing a utility function that
depends on consumption only. Consumption includes expenditures on two consumption
goods and one free public service. The utility function has a quasi-linear form:
U (CY , CX , CS ) = Cα1Y Cα2X + CS
The first term in the utility function is the familiar Cobb-Douglas constant returns
to scale function (α1+α2=1). The second term needs some clarification.
Individuals get utility from consuming both goods and services in their real life,
however, the latter is usually ignored in Economics literature. In the model it is important
to include this term because public services in Kuwait are produced by the government
using mainly Kuwaiti labor who are paid generously, on one hand. On the other hand,
public services are provided at very low prices even below their cost of production. For
example, the cost of producing one Kilo Watt of electricity is KD 0.0186, but is sold for
KD 0.002. Also, the cost of producing one Imperial Gallon of fresh water is KD2.21, but
it is sold for KD 0.8. Moreover, the government buys most of the inputs used in the
production of these services from domestic producers who pay even lower prices for
services. For example, factories in the “Shuaiba” industrial Zone pay KD 0.001 and KD
0.25 for electricity and water, respectively. This is an indirect way of subsidizing
domestic producers. Therefore, it’s clear that services produced by the government have
an important role in subsidizing both consumers and producers.
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In the model the government uses whatever revenues it gets from oil exports to
provide subsidized services (S), buy goods (X and Y), and make transfer payments (T) to
the household:
G = PS N CS + PX GX + PY GY + T
Where:
G: government expenditure.
PS: price of public services
N: population
PX: price of good X
GX: government consumption of good X
PY: price of good Y
GY: government consumption of good Y
To obtain an expression for the household’s consumption of the public service,
we rearrange the above equation
PS N CS = G – (PX GX + PY GY +T)
This shows that the government’s expenditure on public services is a residual.
That is, the difference between total expenditures and expenditures on goods (X and Y)
and transfer payments. Each household’s share of total services is:
CS = (G – (PX GX + PY GY + T)) / N PS
Moreover, in the model (CS ) is not chosen by the household but, it is exogenously
given to it by the government. It also doesn’t show up in the household’s budget
constraint because of its low price, which makes its cost negligible to the household.
The assumption that the household gets utility only from its consumption of
goods and services implies that the household does not value leisure and is willing to
devote all of its time to work. In other words, it has a perfectly elastic labor supply curve.
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Utility maximization is subject to a budget constraint stating that consumption of goods
(X and Y) must be equal to the household’s income from work, transfers, and interest
payments on its initial endowment of capital. It is common in studies dealing with oil
exporting countries in general and Kuwait in particular to subtract oil revenues from total
income (i.e. GDP). That is because the high fluctuations in these revenues do not reflect
actual changes in the economy and they accrue directly to the government, which
monopolizes the oil sector (Morgan, 1979, Crockett and Evans, 1980, Sangarabalan,
1984, Moosa, 1986, Fadil, 1989, and Algahtani, 1992).

Therefore, the household’s budget constraint is specified as follows:
M = PY CY + PX CX
Where M is the household’s income (w L + r K + T)
The solution to the household’s problem is given below.
£ = Cα1Y Cα2X + CS + λ ( M - PY CY - PX CX )
F.O.C.s
∂£/∂CY : α1 Cα1-1Y Cα2X - λ PY = 0

(1)

∂£/∂CX : α2 Cα1Y Cα2-1X - λ PX = 0

(2)

∂£/∂λ :

(3)

M - PY CY - PX CX = 0

Divide (1) by (2) and solve for CX = (PY / PX)( α2/α1) CY

Plug CX into (3) and solve for the optimal values of CY and CX plus CS
CX = α1 M / PX
CY = α2 M / PY
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Since M = w L + r K +T, we can substitute the formulas for (r & w) from the
firm’s problem to obtain demand equations as functions of output prices and factor
endowments.
CX = α1{[(PX Z-1 ) 1-β/(δ -β) (PY A-1 ) δ -1/(δ -β) L + (PY A-1 ) δ/(δ -β) (PX Z –1 )-β/(δ -β) K ]+T}/PX
CY = α2{[(PX Z-1 ) 1-β/(δ -β) (PY A-1 ) δ -1/(δ -β) L + (PY A-1 ) δ/(δ -β) (PX Z –1 )-β/(δ -β) K ]+T}/ PY
The demand equations imply that in the long run, demand for goods (X and Y)
depends on their prices, transfers and endowments of production factors only.
Comparative Statics
Below a number of comparative static exercises are conducted to determine the
signs of the coefficients in the consumption equations that to be estimated in chapter four.
What follows is for good (X) only because it is straightforward to do the same for good
(Y).
ΦX (PX , PY , K, L, T) = CX (PX , PY , w L + r K +T)
ΦX (PX , PY , K, L, T) = CX ( PX , PY , w (PX , PY) L + r (PX , PY) K +T)
Where (ΦX) denotes the general equilibrium demand for good (X), while (CX)
denotes the Marshallian demand.
d ΦX / d PX = (d CX / d PX) + (∂ CX / ∂ M) (∂ M / ∂ PX)
Since M = R, ∂ M / ∂ PX = ∂ R / ∂ PX = QX
d ΦX / d PX = (d CX / d PX) + (∂ CX / ∂ M) QX
= (∂ hX / ∂ PX) - CX (∂ CX / ∂ M) + (d CX / d M) QX
Note that the first two terms on the right hand side represent the Slutsky Equation,
where the first term is the substitution effect (h is the Hicksian demand) and the second is
the income effect.
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d ΦX / d PX = (∂ hX / ∂ PX) + (QX - CX) (d CX / d M) ≤ 0.

(13)

The first term (the own price substitution effect) is non-positive due to the
concavity of the expenditure function. The second term is positive since (QX - CX) is
positive because (X) is the exportable good and (d ΦX / d M) is positive assuming (X) is a
normal good. Overall, the sign of (d ΦX / d PX) depends on the relative magnitudes of the
substitution and income effects. However, if we ignore the income effect, the total effect
is non-positive.
Next, repeat the above analysis for a change in the price of good (Y).
d ΦX / d PY = (d CX / d PY) + (∂ CX / ∂ M) (∂ M / ∂ PY)
Since M = R, ∂ M / ∂ PY = ∂ R / ∂ PY = QY
d ΦX / d PY = (d CX / d PY) + (∂ CX / ∂ M) QY
= (∂ hX / ∂ PY) - CY (∂ CX / ∂ M) + (d CX / d M) QY
= (∂ hX / ∂ PY) + (QY - CY) (d CX / d M) ≥ 0.

(14)

The first term (the cross price substitution effect) is non-negative. This can be
shown by utilizing the property that the Hicksian demand function is homogeneous of
degree zero. Thus, using Euler’s Theorem:
hX = hX (PX , PY)
0 = (∂ hX / ∂ PY) PX + (∂ hX / ∂ PX) PY

(15)

The second term (in the above identity) is non-positive due to the concavity of the
expenditure function, while the first term has to be non-negative in order for the identity
to hold.
The second term (in d ΦX / d PY) is negative since (QY - CY) is negative because
(Y) is the importable good and (d ΦX / d M) is positive assuming (X) is a normal good.
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Overall, the sign of (d ΦX / d PY) depends on the relative magnitudes of the substitution
and income effects. However, if we ignore the income effect, the total effect is nonnegative.
Now, the effect of changes in the endowments of factors of production are
analyzed. First, the effect of a change in the endowment of labor (L).
∂ ΦX / ∂ L = (∂ CX / ∂ M) (∂ M / ∂ L)
= (∂ CX / ∂ M) (∂ R / ∂ L)
= (∂ CX / ∂ M) w ≥ 0

(16)

As discussed above, the first term is non-negative (assuming normality) and the
second term (wage rate) is necessarily non-negative. Thus the total effect is non-negative.
Second, the effect of a change in the endowment of capital (K).
∂ ΦX / ∂ K = (∂ CX / ∂ M) (∂ M / ∂ K)
= (∂ CX / ∂ M) (∂ R / ∂ K)
= (∂ CX / ∂ M) r ≥ 0

(17)

The first term is non-negative (assuming normality) and the second term (rental
price of capital) is necessarily non-negative. Thus the total effect is non-negative.
Linearization
Using the implicit function theorem, the above equations can be rewritten as:
CX = H ( PY , PX , L , K, T )
CY = H ( PY , PX , L , K, T )
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Using the above specifications, the two equations can be estimated as follows:
CX = γ0 + γ1 PX + γ2 PY + γ3 K + γ4 L + γ5 T + e
Expected Signs: γ1 ≤ 0 (13), γ2 ≥ 0 (14), γ3 ≥ 0 (17), γ4 ≥ 0 (16) and γ5 ≥ 0.
CY = ψ0 + ψ1 PX + ψ2 PY + ψ3 K + ψ4 L + ψ5 T+ e
Expected Signs: ψ1 ≥ 0 (13), ψ2 ≤ 0 (14), ψ3 ≥ 0 (17), ψ4 ≥ 0 (16) and γ5 ≥ 0.
Where (e ) is an error term.
Note: Ci is in real term since it was derived from optimization behavior.
Services consumption function is specified as an identity:
CS = (G – (PX GX + PY GY +T)) / N PS
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(3.1.3) THE GOVERNMENT
The government is maximizing social welfare by providing services to its citizens
through a system of highly subsidized services. The government’s objective is subject to
a balanced budget constraint. It equates its total revenues coming from oil exports to the
costs of producing public services. This includes hiring domestic citizens in the public
service sector and buying goods necessary for the production of services from domestic
producers.
Government revenues are exogenous in the model since they depend on two
exogenous factors, namely, oil price and oil production. The former is determined by
supply and demand forces in the world’s market for oil, while the latter is determined by
the quota system of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In sum,
the government is both price and quantity taker. When oil revenues are determined, the
government chooses its expenditures at a level that keeps its budget balanced:
PO QO = G
Where:
PO : price of crude oil
QO : quantity exported of oil
The production of public services is labor intensive, no capital (or capital is
negligible). The government uses labor (LS) to produce services (S):
S = LS
The marginal product of labor (MPLS ) employed in the service sector is:
∂ S / ∂ LS = 1
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Thus, if we equate the wage rate to the value marginal product of labor, this gives:
w = PS MPLS
w = PS
Now, we can use the result above to specify the “national” revenue function:
R = w (LY + LX) + r (KY + KX ) + PS S
R = w (LY + LX) + r (KY + KX ) + w S
R = w (LY + LX) + r (KY + KX ) + w LS
R = w (LY + LX + LS) + r (KY + KX )
R =wL+rK
The government consumes goods (X and Y) during its production of services. The
government is assumed to buy goods produced only by local producers; this is an indirect
way of subsidizing them. Also it employs only domestic labor, which is an indirect way
of redistributing oil revenues to its citizens. The government plays multiple roles in the
model: exports oil, produces public services (S), hires local labor (LS), makes transfer
payments (T), and buys goods from local producers (GX,GY).
Therefore, government’s expenditures are divided between the four activities it carries
out:
G = w L S + PX GX + PY GY + T
= w L S + GXY + T
Where (GXY) is the nominal government’s budget allocated to buy goods (X and Y).
The government’s purchases of goods (X and Y), (GXY), are allocated as follows:
GX = ϑ GXY / PX

and

GY = (1- ϑ) GXY / PY
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(3.1.4) TRADE
As stated earlier, trade between the two countries results from excess supply and
excess demand in the home country. Excess demand in the home country for good (Y)
creates the need for imports from the foreign country. Imports of good (Y) are defined as
follows:
IMY = CY + [(1- ϑ) GXY / PY ] - QY

(<0)

= CY + GY - QY
In subsections (3.1.1 and 3.1.2) it was found that (CY & QY ) are determined by
output prices and factor endowments. In subsection (3.1.3) it was argued that (GY) is
determined by oil revenues and consumption of good X , (GX). Therefore, imports of
good (Y) are determined by the difference between domestic demand and domestic
supply of good (Y).
Similarly, exports of good (X) are determined by the difference between domestic
output and domestic consumption of good (X):
EXX = QX – CX – ϑ GXY / PX

(>0)

= QX – CX – G X
Note: Qi , Ci ,and Gi are all in real terms.
In subsections (3.1.1 and 3.1.2) we have shown that (CX and QX ) are determined
by output prices and factor endowments. In section (3.1.3) we argued that (GX) is
determined by oil revenues and consumption of good Y (GY). Therefore, exports of good
(X) are simultaneously determined by supply of and demand for good (X).
It is clear that consumers are better off with trade than in the case of Autarky, i.e.
no trade. That’s because with imports of good (Y) they can consume their optimum level
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of this good that is composed of domestic output and imports. However, without trade,
they will consume domestic output only, which is less than total demand. That is, good
(Y) is in excess demand, which may push prices up.
Producers of good (X) are also better off with trade because they can sell their
optimum output to both domestic markets and foreign markets. Without trade, they have
to cut back production to keep supply equal to demand or their output is in an excess
supply. Moreover, the assumption that the small country faces an infinitely elastic
demand schedule for its exports means that producers of good (X) can export whatever
they produce, at the optimum.
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(3.1.5) EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
As mentioned several times, an essential assumption in general equilibrium
models is that all markets are in equilibrium. Therefore, in this subsection we introduce
equilibrium conditions in product markets, input markets, and the balanced budget
condition.
a) EQULIBRIUM IN THE LABOR MARKET
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the free mobility of factors of
production between sectors ensures that the markets for labor and capital are in
equilibrium. That is, supply equals demand in both markets.
Supply = Demand
L

= LX + LY + LS

Where:
L
LX
LY
LS

: total labor supply
: labor employed in the production of good (X)
: labor employed in the production of good (Y)
: labor employed in the production of public services (S)

b) EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CAPITAL MARKET
Supply = Demand
K

= KX + KY

Where:
K: total capital supply
KX : capital employed in the production of good (X)
KY : capital employed in the production of good (Y)
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c) EQUILIBRIUM IN THE GOODS MARKET
Because of international trade, the market for good (X) is in equilibrium.
Otherwise, the market would be in excess supply.
Good (X):

Supply = Demand
QX = CX + EXX + GX

Where:
QX : domestic output of good (X)
CX : household consumption of good (X)
EXX : exports to the foreign country of good (X)
GX : government consumption of good (X)
Because of international trade, the market for good (Y) is, also, in equilibrium.
Otherwise, the market would be in excess demand.
Good (Y):

Supply

= Demand

QY + IMY = CY + GY
Where:
QY : domestic output of good (Y)
CY : household consumption of good (Y)
IMY : home country’s imports of good (Y)
G Y : government consumption of good (Y)

d) BALANCED GOVERNMENT BUDGET
The final condition is that of the balanced government budget.
Oil Revenues = Government Expenditure
POQO

= G

Where:
PO : price of crude oil
QO: quantity of oil exported
G : government expenditure
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(3.2) TRADE WITH TARIFFS
The previous section derived the model’s supply and demand equations without
mentioning the presence of distortionary protection policies used by either country. This
section and the next two sections will take into account trade distortions that exist in the
real world. This section will modify the original model by incorporating protection
policies, namely, import tariffs by both countries. The objective is to investigate their
effects on prices of goods (X and Y), which in turn affect all the relevant functions in the
home country. Moreover, the new specifications are used in the next chapter in
estimating the effects of the WTO rules that require member countries to reduce their
protection barriers.
A good starting point in the analysis of tariffs is to examine prices of the tradable
goods (X and Y). First, begin with the price of good (Y). The price (PY) is the price paid
by the consumers of good (Y) in the home country and already includes import tariffs by
the home country. The world price of good (Y) is (P*Y), which the foreign country
charges for its exports.
Now, consider an import (ad valorem) tariff by the home country at a rate (τY) on
imports of good (Y). The price of good (Y) in the home country becomes:
PY = P*Y ( 1 + τY )
Where:
PY : domestic price of good (Y) in the home country
P*Y : world price of good (Y)
τY : tariff rate on imports of good (Y) by the home country
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Since the tariff rate is greater than zero, then the domestic price must be greater
than the world price. Domestic producers take advantage of the price increase induced by
the tariff and they, too, raise their price to equal the world price plus the tariff. In other
words, they free ride. The government collects tariff revenues and returns them to the
households as transfer payments. A common assumption in the international trade
literature is that the government collects tariff revenues costlessly. As a result, the
households’ income is not affected by the tariff since tariff revenues are fully returned to
them as transfers. Thus, there is no redistribution effect of income from the tariff.
A similar analysis is applied to the effect on the price of good (X) of a tariff
imposed by the foreign country at a rate (τ*X).
The domestic price of (X) in the foreign country equals to:
P*X = PX ( 1 + τ*X )
Where:
P*X : domestic price of good (X) in the foreign country
PX : world price of good (X)
τ*X : tariff rate on good (X) by the foreign country
In what follows, the above effects are incorporated into the original model, which
has to be modified to account for tariffs. First, note that tariffs have no effect on the
domestic price of (X) in the home country, so it remains (PX). Second, all the supply and
demand equations for the home country that include (PY) have to be modified since (PY)
has been modified to: PY = P*Y ( 1 + τY ). Third, the national revenue equation has to

62

be modified to include tariff revenues collected by the government. These (tariff)
revenues equal:
Rt = P*Y τY IMY
Or

Rt = ((PY)/ ( 1 + τY )) τY IMY
Below are the modified equations that to be estimated in the next chapter to obtain

parameters that to be used in simulation exercises. The objective is to obtain estimates of
the potential economic effects of the WTO on supply, demand, welfare and terms of trade
in the home country.

QX = φ0 + φ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY ) + φ2 PX + φ3 L + φ4 K + e
QY = ϕ0 + ϕ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY ) + ϕ2 PX + ϕ3 L + ϕ4 K + e
LY = ξ0 + ξ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY )

+ ξ2 PX + ξ3 L + ξ4 K + e

KY = µ0 + µ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY ) + µ2 PX + µ3 L + µ4 K + e
LX = Ω0 + Ω1 P*Y ( 1 + τY ) + Ω2 PX + Ω3 L + Ω4 K + e
KX = θ0 + θ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY )

+ θ2 PX + θ3 L

CX = γ0 + γ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY )

+ γ2 PX + γ3 L + γ4 K + γ5 T + e

CY = ψ0 + ψ1 P*Y ( 1 + τY )

+ ψ2 PX + ψ3 L + ψ4 K + ψ5 T + e

R

= w L + r K + P*Y τY IMY

G = PO QO + P*Y τY IMY
GY = (1- ϑ) GXY / P*Y ( 1 + τY )
IMY = CY + (1- ϑ) GXY / P*Y ( 1 + τY ) - QY
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+ θ4 K + e

(3.3) ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TARIFFS
The imposition of the import tariff by the home country has multiple effects on
the economy. First, there is an effect on the terms of trade (PX/ PY), it decreases. The
tariff on (Y) increases the relative price of (Y) which, according to Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, increases the return on the resource used more intensively in its production.
Given the mobility of resources between sectors, capital and labor is diverted to the
production of the protected good, (Y). Second, assuming normality, consumption of (Y)
falls as its price increases. Thus, imports of (Y) decrease. However, the consumption of
good (X) may increase or decrease, depending on the magnitudes of the substitution and
income effects and which one dominates the other. Third, there is a welfare loss due to
the imposition of the tariff that can be decomposed into consumption loss and production
loss. The consumption loss arises from the distortion of prices facing the household
which reduces its consumption of good (Y), as mentioned above. The production loss
results from the distortion of prices facing producers, which shifts resources from
producing (X) to producing (Y).
Trade Economists are interested in the measurement of the economic effects of
tariffs. First, it is important to quantify the effects of the tariff on the supply of output of
the two goods (X and Y) and on demand for both consumption of the two goods and the
demand for factors of production (capital and labor). Second, measuring the effects on
the balance of trade that results from the change in the terms of trade (relative prices) and
supply and demand is necessary. Finally, measuring the welfare loss that results from the
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imposition of the tariff on imports needs to be accomplished. Below is an algebraic
derivation of the welfare effect of the tariff using two approaches: The balance of trade
function approach, which is derived from the income expenditure identity, and the direct
welfare evaluation approach, which is derived from the expenditure function.

(3.3.1) THE BALANCE OF TRADE FUNCTION
A widely used approach in the international trade literature to measure the welfare
effect of tariffs is the balance of trade function approach, which is derived from the
income-expenditure identity. We assume that import tariffs are the only distortions in the
economy. For derivations and applications of the expenditure function see: Diamond and
McFadden (1974), Dixit (1975), Kay (1980), Small and Rosen (1981), Hausman (1981),
Marion and Svensson (1986), Llyod and Schweinberger (1988), Vousden (1990), and
Thurman (1993). Below we derive a measure of the welfare effect that results from a
change in either/both tariff rates or/and world prices. The derivation is based on the
expenditure and the balance of trade functions.
Define the expenditure function as:
E(P,u) = min {PC:U (C) = u}
By Shephard’s lemma, the compensated demand for consumption can be obtained
by taking the derivative of the expenditure function with respect to the price of output:
∂ E (P,u) /∂ Pi = Ep = C (P,u)

(1)
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The linear homogeneity of E with respect to price implies (by Euler’s theorem) that:
∑ P Ep = E

(2)

and
∑ P Epu = Eu
Next, define the national income (revenue or GDP) function as
R (P,v) = max { PQ: Φ (Q,v) = 0 }
Where Φ (Q,v) is the economy’s production frontier and “v” is a vector of inputs.
Using the envelope theorem, output can be determined by taking the partial
derivative of the national income function with respect to the price of output:
∂ R (P,v) /∂ P = Rp = Q (P,v)

(3)

and using Euler’s theorem,
∑ P Rp = R

(4)

The economy’s budget constraint is:
E (P,u) = R (P,v) + τ p* IM

(5)

Where IM = [Ep – Rp] is the compensated demand for imports and (τ) is the tariff rate.
Note that (P) is defined as (P*(1+τ)). Totally differentiate (5)
Ep dP + Eu du = Rp dP + τ IM dP* + P* IM dτ + τ P* dIM
Take (Rp dP) to the left to define (IM dP)
IM dP + Eu du = τ IM dP* + P* IM dτ + τ P* dIM
Eu du = τ IM dP* + P* IM dτ + τ P* dIM - IM dP
Eu du = τ IM dP* + P* IM dτ + τ P* dIM - IM [P* dτ + (1+τ) dp*]
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(6)

Eu du = [τ IM – IM (1+τ)] dP* + τ P* dIM
Eu du = – IM dP* + τ P* dIM
Multiply the second term on the right hand side by ((dp/dp) (IM/IM) (P/P)) to
obtain the compensated elasticity of demand for imports (ηC ),
Eu du = – IM dP* + τ P* (dIM/dP) (P/IM) (IM/P) dP
Eu du = – IM dP* + τ ηC P* IM (dP/P)
Multiply the first term on the right hand side by (P*/P*) to express the change in
the world price as a percentage rate, this gives the expression for the equivalent variation
using the balance of trade function:
Eu du = – IM P* (dP*/P*) + τ ηC P* IM (dP/P)

(7)

Equation (7) provides an exact measure of the welfare effect that results from a
change in the world price of the importable good or a change in the tariff rate. For
example, a percentage change in the tariff rate is captured by the percentage change in the
domestic price (dP/P). However, a percentage change in the world price is captured by
changes in both, the percentage change in the world price term (dP*/P*) and the
percentage change in domestic price term (dP/P). The latter effect results from the price
transmission assumption, which comes from the assumption that the small country is a
price taker, therefore the domestic price must equal the world price. In addition, equation
(7) can also be used to measure the welfare effect of export taxes, which have the same
effect as import tariffs, according to Lerner’s Theorem.
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Equation (7) can be numerically measured since all the right hand side terms can
be easily calculated, one term that needs some effort is the own price elasticity of the
compensated demand for imports (ηC). As it was shown above, (ηC) can be found by
taking the second derivatives of the expenditure and revenue functions and then
multiplying them by (P/IM). Empirically, however, researchers estimate (ηC), instead of
deriving it theoretically, as follows. Using a log-linear function, regress imports on
import prices and economic activity variable (GDP) where the coefficients of price and
income are price and income elasticities, respectively. However, price elasticity obtained
above is the uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticity but what we need is the
compensated (Hicksian) price elasticity, which can be obtained from the Slutsky
equation:
∂ IMU / ∂ p = ∂ IMC / ∂ p - IM ∂ IMU / ∂ R

(8)

Where superscripts (U and C) correspond to uncompensated and compensated demand
for imports respectively, while R is income.
After some algebraic manipulations (see Appendix (2) for details), the compensated
elasticity is specified as follows:
ηC = ηU + ψ ηR

(9)

Where ψ is the share of expenditure on the importable good in total expenditure and ηR is
the income elasticity. Since the second term on the right hand side is necessarily positive
(assuming normality), it is obvious that ηC must exceed ηU , in absolute value.
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Finally, the welfare effect (equation (7)) can be measured also as a percentage of
income (GDP) by dividing both sides by R;
Eu du / R = – IM P* / R (dP*/P*) + τ ηC P* IM / R (dP/ P)
Eu du / R = – Ω (dP*/P* ) + Ω τ ηC (dP/ P)

(7’)

Where Ω = IM P* / R

(3.3.2) DIRECT WELFARE EVALUATION
There are two measures of direct evaluation of welfare, namely, the Compensating
Variation (CV) and the Equivalent Variation (EV). Shoven and Whalley (1984) and
Brown and Whalley (1980) have estimated the welfare effect of reducing tariffs using the
CV and EV. Their results show that the two measures give close estimates. Therefore, I
decided to use the EV in estimating the welfare effect.
Welfare economists commonly use the Equivalent variation (EV) as a measure of
welfare effect of tax and tariff policies. The EV is defined as the amount of income that
can be taken away from the consumer, at the initial prices, to make him as well off as he
would be at the new prices. Below is a derivation of the EV (based on Vousden, 1990),
for the case of a change in the tariff rate.
EV = E(p1,u1) – E(p0 ,u1) – [g (p1 ,v) - g (p0 ,v)] – [TR(p1 ,u1) – TR(p0 ,u1)]

(10)

Where TR(.) is tariff revenue and subscripts (0&1) denote before and after the change
in the tariff rate, respectively.

69

Using (5), (10) can be rearranged to:
EV = E(p0,u0) – E(p0 ,u1)

(11)

Define “p” as the price vector under the current tariff regime and “p*” as the free trade
price vector. Using Taylor Series expansion of (10) about p = p* ,
EV = - 0.5 ∑∑ SPiPj ti tj
EV = - 0.5 ∑∑ [∂ Ci (p* , u1 )/ ∂ pj - ∂ Qi (p*)/ ∂pj ] ti tj

(12)

We can rearrange (12) to find EV as a proportion of GDP (R),
EV/R= - 0.5 ∑∑ ri rj ηij αi

(13)

Where :
ri = tariff rate = (p-p*)/p = ti / pi
ηij = elasticity of demand for imports of good “i” with respect to price of good “j”
αi = share of imports of good “i” in GDP = Pi IM i / R
Next, the case of the welfare effects of reducing tariffs must be considered. To do
so, totally differentiate (10),
d EV/ R = - 1/Y ∑∑ ti SPiPj dti
d EV/ R = - ∑∑ ri ηij αi dti / pj

(14)

Now, suppose that all tariffs were reduced by k,
dti = -k ti

for all k > 0

Thus, the final expression for the welfare gain from reducing tariffs as a
proportion of GDP, for the n good case, is given in equation (15):
d EV/ R = k ∑∑ ri rj ηij αi

(15)
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The above analysis was based on the n (import) good case, however, our model is
based on the one (import) good case. Therefore, equations (13) and (15) have to be
modified for the one import good case as follows:
Equation (13) has to be:
EV/R= - 0.5 r2 η α

(13’)

and equation (15) has to be:
d EV/ R = 0.5 k η α r0 (r1 +r0) / (1- r1)

(15’)

Note that (13’) is a special case of (15’), that is when k =1 which corresponds to
the case of full trade liberalization (t=0), as a result r1 = 0.
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(3.4) ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OTHER WTO AGREEMENTS
The last two sections have discussed the economic effects of reducing tariffs on
welfare and supply and demand functions in the home country because tariff reduction is
one the most significant agreements signed by WTO members. This reduction is intended
to reduce trade barriers and to smooth the flow of international trade. However, tariff
reduction agreement is only one of many agreements signed by WTO members to
improve the access of exporters to the world markets. This section discusses and
investigates the effects of some of the WTO agreements that are expected to have some
economic effect on the home country, Kuwait.
Production and export subsidies: The government of Kuwait provides domestic
producers with production support that is prohibited under the WTO agreement on
subsidies. Given the small country assumption (i.e. price taking for exports and imports),
what would be the effect of eliminating the subsidies on both domestic producers and
consumers? For producers, a reduction in subsidies will increase the cost of production
but will not increase prices because domestic firms are price takers. Even if they
increased their prices they would lose their share in the domestic and the international
markets. Therefore, it is expected that producers either cut their costs to stay in the
market or go out of business. Similarly, consumers will not be affected since prices will
remain unchanged.
Anti-dumping Agreement: A common complaint by domestic producers in Kuwait
is that foreign suppliers sell their products in the Kuwaiti market at prices lower than
those charged in the producing country’s market. Enforcement of the Antidumping
Agreement would result in eliminating the dumping practice, which means that import
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prices may go up as a result. The increase in import prices will have a similar effect to
that of imposing an import tariff or import quota. That is, domestic producers benefit
from the price increase since they can charge higher prices for their products, while
consumers will incur a welfare loss because they will pay higher prices. The terms of
trade will decline and imports will decline as well. This possibility is analyzed and
economic effects is quantified in a similar way to that of tariffs.
Government Procurement Agreement: This agreement prohibits governments
from discriminating against foreign suppliers by favoring domestic producers. This
discriminatory behavior is widely practiced by governments. An enforcement of this
agreement would reduce the government’s purchases from domestic producers and may
or may not increase total imports. Here we hypothesize the possibility that the domestic
government is in fact discriminating against foreigners, the question is what would be the
effect on imports? Imports as defined in section (3.1.4), represent the excess demand for
the importable good (Y):
Imports of good (Y) = CY + GY - QY

(<0)

If the government reduced its consumption of the domestic output of good (Y) and
increased its consumption of imports of good (Y), this will have no effect on the volume
of imports since the reduction in the government’s consumption of domestic output is
offset by an increase by the households’ consumption. Similarly, the increase in the
government’s imports is offset by a reduction in the households’ imports. Thus, the net
effect on the demand for domestic output and imports is zero. This result is valid only
under the assumption of homogeneity of the imported and domestic goods.
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The effect on government’s purchases of good (X) is different. By assumption, good
(X) is only domestically produced. If the government uses its purchases of (X) as a way
to subsidize domestic producers this is subjected to the Government Procurement
Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement as well and these purchases
are prohibited. In this case there is an effect on exports of good (X), which were defined
in section (3.1.4) as the excess supply of good (X):
Exports of (X) = QX – CX – GX

(>0)

The reduction in GX will increase the excess supply and therefore increases exports,
assuming the country faces infinitely elastic demand schedule for its exports.
Finally, a potential consequence of the implementation of the WTO agreements, is a
reduction in world prices of merchandise. The reduction in prices may result from some
or all of the following reasons:
1) The reduction in tariffs on capital goods, crude materials and services would reduce
the costs of production and prices may fall as a result.
2) The opening of new markets for exports would allow firms to take advantage of
economies of scale as they increase output and capacity. Again, costs and prices may fall.
3) The increase in competition, as more suppliers compete in a given market, reduces
prices as suggested by economic theory.
4) The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which will phase out the Multifibre
Arrangement that has restricted exports of textile since 1974, will reduce textile prices as
quota restrictions imposed by developed countries on imports from developing countries
is eliminated. Competition from low cost products from developing countries with high
cost products from developed countries will put a downward pressure on textile and
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clothing prices.
Overall, it is expected that consumers around the world will enjoy lower prices of
goods as a result of the enforcement of the WTO rules of trade. The decline in world
prices is analyzed in a similar way to that of a tariff reduction.
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CHAPTER (4)

ESTIMATION

INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, section (4.1) briefly
discusses the data that is used in estimation and the problems that were faced. Second,
section (4.2) estimates the demand and supply equations obtained in chapter three
(section 3.1). These equations are estimated under the current regime with no changes in
either trade policy or external shocks. Finally, in section (4.3), welfare effects of the
current regime are estimated.
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(4.1) DATA
A common problem facing empirical studies using time-series in general and
studies dealing with Less Developed Countries (LDCs) is the availability of data. The
data availability problem is divided into three main branches; length, depth and
reliability.

(4.1.1) LENGTH
It is almost impossible to find times-series data for LDCs for periods before the
1950s. This leaves researchers dealing with these countries with not enough data to get
concrete and reliable results. A survey by Khayum (1991) of thirteen econometric models
of LDCs that use time-series data shows that the number of observations used in these
studies is between eight (Carter, 1970) and twenty two (Central Bureau of Statistics,
1984; Paul, 1970). A summary of these models is provided in table (24) in Appendix (5).
This study is not an exception, the earliest time series data for Kuwait begin in 1960.
However, trade data, which are essential to this study, start from 1969. The latest data
available are for the year 1999. This leaves us with only thirty one annual observations.
In this study, twelve studies of Kuwait that used time-series data were surveyed. It was
found that the number of “annual” observations was between seven (Crockett and Evans,
1980) and twenty eight (Abdulghani, 1991). Other studies that use “quarterly” data have
observations between twenty four (Moosa, 1986) and forty four (Fadil, 1989; Perera,
1994). Table (25) in Appendix (6) provides a summary of these studies.
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(4.1.2) DEPTH
By depth we mean the disaggregation of the data. LDCs’ data usually cover main
economic indicators only, while in developed countries each main economic indicator is
disaggregated into a number of detailed indicators. This study faced also the data depth
problem.
First, private consumption data are available in one aggregated series. However,
what was needed were disaggregated series for the different types of consumption (e.g.
food, manufacturing and services). Since the emphasis of the study is on two types of
manufactured goods, a way had to be found to disaggregate consumption of manufactured
goods into consumption of the importable good (Y) and the exportable good (X).
Regarding good (Y), there are data sets available for domestic production and imports.
These two sets can be used to find a data set for consumption. Assuming that consumption
of good (Y) equals domestic production plus imports, consumption was found by adding
domestic production and imports. Regarding good (X), the available data sets cover
domestic production and exports. These two series were used to find a data set for
consumption. This was done by assuming that domestic production is divided between
domestic consumption and exports, no change in inventories. Consumption of good (X)
was found by subtracting exports from domestic production. Next, the consumption of
goods (X and Y) was added to find total consumption. The shares of the goods (X and Y)
were 3.4% and 96.6%, respectively.
Second, government consumption data are available in more detail than private
consumption. However, consumption of manufactured goods (X and Y) is available in one
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series only. To disaggregate this series, it was assumed that the government consumes the
same shares of the two goods as the household.
Third, fixed capital data have two problems. First, no data were available for the
capital stock, only annual investment data. The latter was used to generate capital stock
using the capital evolution equation, which is a fundamental equation in growth and real
business cycle models in explaining the growth in capital stock. Here the equation is used
in obtaining approximations for the capital stock in Kuwait during the sample period.
This was also done by Kwack (1986) in estimating the capital stock in Korea.
The earliest available investment expenditure data are for 1960, so it was assumed
that the initial capital stock is the same as the amount of investment in that year. This
assumption is not unreasonable because Kuwait started exporting oil in the early fifties of
the last century and used oil revenues in developing a modern economy.
Next, I applied the capital evolution equation for the rest of the sample period as
follows:
Kt = It + (1-δ) Kt-1
Where K is capital, δ is the depreciation rate, I is investment and subscript t
stands for time. Following studies in the real business cycle literature, it was assumed that
the depreciation rate is 10% [Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992, 1993, 1994), Hansen
(1985), Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Van Wincoop (1996)].
The second problem (with capital) is the destruction of a significant share of the
capital stock during the Iraqi invasion in 1990-91. Unfortunately, no estimates exist about
what percentage of capital was destroyed during that period. To get an approximation of
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the damage to capital, it was assumed that the percentage destruction of capital equals the
percentage reduction in non-oil GDP during the 1990-91 period. This makes sense
because capital is used in the production of domestic goods and services, therefore
destruction of capital would result in a decline in non-oil GDP by approximately the same
portion. Non-oil GDP declined by 26.2% in 1990 and by 13.4% in 1991. In addition,
another approximation was specified for rebuilding capital following the war in 1992.
Again, non-oil GDP was used as approximation, which increased by 44% in 1992.
Capital was assumed to increase proportionally.

(4.1.3) RELIABILITY
Another problem that is more common in LDCs is reliability. When data sets are
unreliable they suffer from measurement errors and different government institutions give
different numbers for the same economic indicator. Again, Kuwait is not an exception.
There was no way to avoid this problem, but to mitigate, the available data from the most
reliable source, the Ministry of Planning, was used.
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(4.2) ESTIMATING THE MODEL
In chapter three (section 3.1) supply and demand equations were derived by
solving the household and the firm optimization problems. It was shown that these
equations could be specified as functions of output prices and endowments of factors of
production. This section will estimate these equations using real annual data (in 1994
prices) for Kuwait for the period between 1969 and 1999. The choice of the estimation
technique is critical because the coefficients that are obtained in this section is used in
chapter five in a number of simulation exercises. Below is a discussion of and a
comparison among the three techniques considered, including a justification of the
chosen technique.
Ordinary Least Squares: This technique is widely used because of its simplicity and
attractive properties that make it a popular and powerful tool in regression analysis
(Gujarati, 1995). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique produces estimates that
are known as Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE). However, OLS is based on
restrictive assumptions that are difficult to meet in applied work. One assumption is that
if a system of equations is estimated simultaneously, all the explanatory variables have to
be exogenous. Otherwise, the problem of simultaneous equations arises. Fortunately, in
the system that is being used in this study all the explanatory variables are exogenous.
Another assumption is that the estimation’s errors between the equations of the model are
uncorrelated. This assumption may be violated in the current model since almost the
same explanatory variables are used in all the equations (except the lagged dependent
variables) making the possibility of correlation between errors across equations
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significant. Therefore, the estimates obtained from OLS may be biased and inefficient,
therefore an alternative technique should be used.
Seemingly Unrelated Regression: If the errors between the model’s equations are
correlated, as may be the case in the current model, then this technique is more
appropriate than OLS. The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique, also
known as the multivariate regression, or Zellner's method, obtains estimates of the
parameters of the model by working recursively, accounting for heteroskedasticity, and
contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. Unfortunately, when SUR
was tested empirically, there were signs of serial correlation in the errors that needed to
be corrected. One way of correction is to use a procedure known as the “Cochrane-Orcutt
two-step procedure” developed by Chochrane and Orcutt (1949). This procedure consists
of series of iterations, each of which produces a better estimate of the coefficient of the
lagged error term than the previous one. However, this procedure requires the use of a
first order autoregressive [AR(1)] term, which in turn may be correlated with the lagged
dependent variable. Therefore, the model may suffer from the simultaneity problem that
was described above. In this case the seemingly unrelated regression procedure may
produce inefficient estimates and an alternative technique needs to be used.
Two Stage Least Squares: This procedure is commonly used in estimating models with
endogenous variables on the right hand side of the equations because it corrects for the
simultaneity problem. The Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) technique, as the name
indicates, consists of two stages. In the first, the dependent variables on all the exogenous
variables in the model are regressed using the ordinary least squares technique to obtain
an instrumental variable that is uncorrelated with the errors. In the second stage, the
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instrumental variable in the original equation is used instead of the actual variable and the
ordinary least squares technique is performed. The basic idea of the TSLS technique is to
purify the explanatory variables of the effects of the errors to produce consistent
estimates (Gujarati, 1995). Because the TSLS technique produces consistent estimates
while the other two don’t because of the problem of autocorrelation in the errors, it is
used in this study as the tool to estimate the eight supply and demand equations.
In addition, all regressions were tested for the problem of serial correlation (in the
errors), which is common in time-series regressions. The tool usually used to detect the
presence of this problem is the Durbin-Watson statistic developed by Durbin and Watson
(1951). However, since a lagged dependent variable was used in all of the regressions,
the Durbin-Watson Statistic becomes inappropriate because it is biased toward showing
no serial correlation even if the errors are correlated (Gujarati, 1995; Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1991). Alternatively, another test is used known as Durbin-h, which was
developed by Durbin (1970). The Durbin-h test has the advantage of not being affected
by either the number of explanatory variables or lagged variables. Durbin-h, however,
has two shortcomings. First, it cannot be used if the denominator is negative because we
cannot take the square root of a negative number, a problem which occurs if the product
of the variance of the lagged variable and the number of observations is greater than one.
Second, it detects only first order serial correlation.
An alternative test for serial correlation is the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test
known also as the Breusch-Godfrey test developed by Godfrey (1978) and Breusch
(1978). Unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic for AR(1) errors, the LM test may be used to
test for higher order AR errors, and is applicable whether or not there are lagged
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dependent variables. Therefore, it is recommended whenever there is concern with the
possibility that errors exhibit autocorrelation. The null hypothesis of the LM test is that
there is no serial correlation up to lag order p. The LM test is performed in two steps.
First, the regression equation is estimated using OLS and the errors are obtained. Second,
the errors on all the regressors in the original equation plus the lagged values of the errors
up to the p lag are regressed.
The criteria used to detect the presence of serial correlation are the t-statistics of
the lagged errors and the (n-p*R2) of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic. This LM
statistic is computed as the number of observations minus the residual lags times the Rsquared obtained from second step regression. Under quite general conditions, the LM
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-Square test: χ2 (p). Fortunately, the
EVIEWS software that is used in this study reports the LM test statistic and the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. In the next subsections the probability of the
LM test is reported with each regression and abbreviated as: LM-p. Any LM-p higher
than 0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e. no serial correlation) cannot be rejected at
5% or lower levels of significance. Tests is based on two lags of the errors.
All notations are the same as those used in chapter three. A summary of the
results is provided in table (26) in Appendix (7). The equations were estimated in loglinear forms, which means that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as
elasticities. Note, numbers in parentheses below any regression are the t-statistics.
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(4.2.1) PRODUCTION
Below are the estimation results for the two production functions. First, good (X):
QX = -11.2 – 1.8 PY + 1.1 PX + 0.8 L + 0.3 K + 0.9 EXOIL + 0.02 QX (t-1)
(-3.2) (3.4) (1.4) (0.8)
(6.2)
(0.1)
R2 = 0.84

LM-p = 0.4

The estimated equation shows that the coefficients of prices are statistically
significant with the correct signs. The coefficient of (PX) suggests that an increase in (PX)
by one percent increases (QX) by 1.1 percent , while the coefficient of (PY) suggests that
an increase in the price of good (Y) by one percent decreases (QX) by 1.8 percent. The
coefficients of the factor endowments are both positive but statistically insignificant
suggesting that (QX) is unresponsive to changes in (L) and (K). The coefficient of oil
exports (EXOIL) is positive and highly significant, implying that an increase in (EXOIL) by
one percent increases (QX) by 0.9 percent. This result is consistent with the fact that the
chemical industry is dependent on the oil industry and is affected by the same factors that
affect the latter. Finally, coefficient of the lagged (QX) is positive but statistically
insignificant, suggesting that past levels of production do not influence the current level.
This is consistent with the fact that the chemical industry is export-oriented, making it
vulnerable to changes in world prices, supply, and demand.
Next, the results of estimating (QY) are presented:
QY = 3.1 + 0.2 PY + 0.2 PX - 0.4 L + 0.6 K + 0.2 EXOIL + 0.1 QY (t-1)
(0.8)
(1.5) (-1.2) (3.3)
(2.8)
(1.0)
R2 = 0.93

LM-p = 0.57
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The estimated equation shows that (PY) has the right sign but (PX) does not. The
coefficients of prices are both statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the labor force
(L) is negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the capital endowment is
positive and highly significant, suggesting that an increase in (K) by one percent
increases (QY) by 0.6 percent. This means that (QY) benefits from the abundance of
capital in the economy. This result contradicts the expectation that (K) has a negative
sign, which was derived from the comparative statics in chapter three and was based on
Rybcznski’s Theorem. The coefficient of oil exports (EXOIL) is positive and statistically
significant, implying that an increase in (EXOIL) by one percent increases (QY) by 0.2
percent. Finally, the coefficient of the lagged (QY) is positive but statistically
insignificant
(4.2.2) CONSUMPTION
Below are the estimation results for the two consumption functions. First, the
consumption function of good (X):
CX = 17.3 – 1.4 PY + 2.9 PX – 4.9 L + 2.9 K – 0.9 T + 0.01 CX (t-1)
(-1.4) (6.5)
(-5.5) (4.6) (-0.9) (0.1)
R2 = 0.78

LM-p = 0.97

The consumption equation shows that (PX) has the wrong sign, which is positive
and highly significant. This result is not surprising since (PX) is highly correlated with the
price of oil, therefore an increase in the price of oil increases the national income, which
makes consumers able to afford more expensive goods (i.e. higher (PX)). The price of
good (Y) is statistically insignificant. The negativity (PY) shows that the income effect
exceeds the substitution effect (this will be discussed in more detail in chapter five).
Labor force (L) has the wrong sign, negative, and is statistically significant, implying that
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an increase in the labor force by one percent reduces the demand for good (Y) by five
percent. Capital endowment (K) has the right sign, positive, and statistically significant,
implying that an increase in capital endowment by one percent increases demand by
about three percent. Note that (K) can be viewed as a measure of income because interest
on capital is one source of income to the household, thus the higher the capital stock a
country accumulates the more it is able to consume. The coefficient of government
transfers (T) to households is negative but statistically insignificant. Finally, the lagged
value of (CX) is positive but statistically insignificant.

Next, the consumption function of good (Y):
CY = -2.0 – 1.0 PY + 0.7 PX - 0.8 L + 0.9 K + 1.0 T + 0.5 CY(t-1)
(-1.6) (3.1) (-2.4) (3.8) (2.3)
(3.1)
R2 = 0.83

LM-p = 0.23

The consumption equation for good (Y) shows that prices (PY and PX) have the
expected signs but only (PX) is statistically significant. This result is not surprising given
the fact that good (Y) is in excess demand making consumers less sensitive to changes in
its price. Factor endowments (L and K) are both statistically significant. However, labor
endowment has the wrong sign, negative, as in the (CX) equation, implying an increase in
(L) by one percent reduces consumption by 0.8 percent. On the other hand, the
coefficient of capital endowment has the right sign, positive, implying that an increase in
(K) by one percent increases the demand for good (Y) by about one percent. As with
(CX), capital endowment can be viewed as a proxy for income since it represents one
source of income to the household as explained in chapter three (subsection 3.1.2). The
coefficient of government transfers (T) is positive and statistically significant, implying
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that an increase in (T) by one percent increases (CY) by about one percent. Finally, the
lagged value of (CY) is positive and statistically significant implying that an increase in
last year’s consumption by one percent increases current consumption by 0.5 percent.
(4.2.3) DEMAND FOR CAPITAL
This subsection analyzes the results of the demand for capital equations. First, for
good (X):
KX = 5.9 – 0.04 PY - 0.1 PX - 0.5 L + 1.1 K – 0.1 EXOIL + 0.5 KX (t-1)
(-0.1) (-0.5) (-1.4) (5.2)
(-1.9)
(4.4)
R2 = 0.95

LM-p = 0.51

The estimated equation for the demand for capital in the production of good (X)
does not depend on the prices of goods (X and Y), both are statistically insignificant.
Demand for capital (KX) is sensitive to changes in the endowment of capital, which has
the right sign, positive, and statistically significant. It implies that an increase in (K) by
one percent increases (KX) by 1.1 percent. This is consistent with the fact that the
production of good (X) is capital intensive, making it benefit from the abundance of
capital in the economy. The coefficient of (L) has the right sign, negative, but statistically
insignificant. The negativity of (L) is consistent with the Rybcznski’s Theorem. The
coefficient of oil exports (EXOIL) is negative and statistically significant (at 10% level of
significance), implying that an increase in oil exports by one percent reduces the demand
for capital in the (X) industry by 0.1 percent. Finally, the lagged level of (KX) is highly
significant and positive, suggesting that an increase in (KX) by one percent increases the
demand in the current year by 0.5 percent.
Next, demand for capital for good (Y):
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KY = 3.4 + 0.4 PY – 0.4 PX - 0.1 L + 0.5 K + 0.1 EXOIL + 0.6 KY (t-1)
(1.1) (-2.5) (-0.2) (2.1)
(0.8)
(3.3)
R2 = 0.92

LM-p = 0.45

The estimated function for the demand for capital in the production of good (Y)
does not depend on the price of good (Y), which is statistically insignificant. However,
the price of good (X) has the right sign, negative, and is statistically significant, implying
that an increase in (PX) by one percent reduces the demand for capital (KY) by 0.4%. This
result is consistent with the Samuelson-Stopler Theorem. In addition, the (Y) industry’s
demand for capital is negatively affected by the demand for capital in the (X) industry
(which depends positively on the price of good (X)) because the stock of capital in the
economy is assumed to be fixed in the short run. The factors of production (L and K)
have the unexpected signs but only (K) is statistically significant, implying that an
increase in (K) by one percent increases the demand for capital (KY) by 0.5 percent. This
shows that sector (Y) benefits from the abundance of capital in the economy. Exports of
oil have a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient. Finally, the lagged level of
demand for capital is positive and statistically significant, implying that an increase in
previous demand by one percent increases the demand in the current period by 0.6
percent.
(4.2.4) DEMAND FOR LABOR
This subsection presents the results of estimating the demand for labor equations.
First, demand for capital for good (X):
LX = -0.7 – 0.02 PY + 0.3 PX - 0.3 L + 0.4 K + 0.03 EXOIL + 0.7 LX (t-1)
(-0.1)
(1.9) (-1.1) (2.1)
(0.4)
(5.0)
R2 = 0.94

LM-p = 0.54
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The coefficient of (PY) has the right sign, negative, but statistically insignificant,
while the coefficient of (PX) has the right sign, positive, and statistically significant (at
10% level of significance). The latter implies that an increase in (PX) by one percent
increases the demand for labor by 0.02 percent. This result is consistent with the
Samuelson-Stopler Theorem. Labor endowment has the right sign, negative, but
statistically insignificant. Capital endowment’s coefficient has the right sign, positive,
and statistically significant, implying that an increase in (K) by one percent increases the
demand for labor (LX) by 0.4 percent. This result is consistent with the Rybcznski’s
Theorem. The coefficient of oil exports (EXOIL) is positive but statistically insignificant.
Finally, the lagged value of (LX) is positive and highly statistically significant, implying
that an increase in last year’s demand for labor by one percent increases the demand in
the current year by 0.7 percent.
Next, demand for labor for good (Y):
LY = - 0.4 + 0.3 PY - 0.01 PX + 0.04 L + 0.1 K + 0.04 EXOIL + 0.6 Ly (t-1)
(1.1)
(-0.1)
(0.1)
(0.9)
(0.8)
(2.8)
R2 = 0.90

LM-p = 0.42

The coefficients of prices of goods (X and Y) are statistically insignificant.
Factor endowments are statistically insignificant. The coefficient of oil exports is positive
but statistically insignificant. Finally, the lagged level of (LY) is positive and statistically
significant, implying that an increase in last year’s demand by one percent increases
current year’s demand by 0.6 percent.
Comments
Before concluding the estimation section, it is noteworthy to comment on two issues.
First, the robustness of the results obtained from the current specification of the model.
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Specifically, we want to know how would the results change if two of the explanatory
variables were omitted, namely, government transfers and oil revenues. In an earlier
version of the model, these two variables were not specified, however they were included
in the current model. The results of the earlier version of the model are summarized in
table (27) in Appendix (8). The results show that among the forty coefficients estimated,
only three have changed signs. This shows that the estimated coefficients are, relatively,
robust and insensitive to model specification.
Second, as it was mentioned earlier in this section, the coefficients of the labor force
in some of the estimated equations have the wrong signs and statistically significant as in
the consumption equations. These results indicate that there are other factors affecting the
relationship between consumption and the labor force that are not fully captured by the
model. One explanation may be related to the unusual structure of the labor force in
Kuwait. Kuwait is highly dependent on foreign workers who have two characteristics.
First, they work on the basis of limited time contracts and are not granted permanent
residency or citizenship. This discourages them from consuming or investing their
earnings in Kuwait because they know that they have to leave as soon as their contracts
expire. Therefore, they transfer most of their earnings to their home countries. For
example, in 1999 foreign employees transferred KD 400 million or 9.1% of non-oil GDP.
Second, a significant portion of foreign labor work at low pay jobs, which gives them a
low purchasing power and as a result lowers consumption. In sum, the characters of the
labor market and the immigration policies in Kuwait may explain the negativity of the
labor force coefficients in the consumption equations in particular and other equations in
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general. A more ambitious research may look at the labor market at a more disaggregated
level.
(4.3) WELFARE LOSS
This section estimates the welfare loss from the current tariff regime in Kuwait.
The tool that is used in the estimation is the Equivalent Variation (EV) measure of
welfare loss (equation (13’)) that was derived in section (3.3.2). The EV, as a percentage
of GDP was defined as follows:
EV/GDP = - 0.5 r2 ηC α

(1)

Where r = (P – P*)/ P = t / P, ηC = (∂ IM C / ∂ P) P/ IM C, and α = P* IM C / GDP.
The first term in the EV is (r2), which is the square of the tariff rate. This term was
calculated under the current tariff rate of 4%. Thus, r is:
r = (1.04 - 1) / 1.04 = 0.038
and
r2 = 0.0015
The second term is the compensated price elasticity of imports (ηC). As stated in
section (3.7.1), this term is empirically estimated by regressing imports on import prices
and GDP. However, a great debate exists about the accuracy of estimates of import
elasticity. They are accused of being biased downward (Orcutt, 1950) or upward (Magee,
1975). Empirical estimates vary by countries and estimation techniques. Below, some
estimates from the literature are presented for developed countries : Houthakker and
Magee (1969): (-0.13 and –1.66), Cline et al (1978): (-0.61 and –1.94), De Melo and Tarr
(1990): (-1.8 and –3.9) and Floyd (1965): (-1.5 and – 2.7).

However, developing

countries, with higher dependency on imports, have elasticities less than those of
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developed countries. In the case of Kuwait, no estimates of manufactured imports exist;
and only one study (Khoja and Sadler (1979)) has estimated the elasticity for demand for
total imports to be (-1.83). In the current study, the import price elasticity won’t be
estimated, because of the controversy surrounding its estimation, but it is assigned two
values. One value is (-0.5), corresponding to an inelastic demand for imports, and another
value (-1.5), corresponding to an elastic demand for imports. These are short-term
elasticities.
The last term in the EV equation is (α), defined as the ratio of nominal imports (of
good Y only) to GDP. It was calculated straightforwardly by dividing (P*IM) by (GDP)
for each year. (α) ranges between (0.05 and 0.25) with a mean (0.14).
In addition to calculating EV as a percentage of GDP, it can be calculated in terms
of money (millions of KDs). Thus, the relevant EV becomes:
EV = - 0.5 r2 ηC P* IM

(2)

The next two subsections will discuss the results of estimating the EV under the
two measures.
(4.3.1) EV in Money Metric
In equation (1), all the terms on the right hand side are constants except for (α),
which changes over time depending on the ratio of nominal imports to GDP. Table (8)
presents the results of estimating equation (1) for the sample period (1969-1999). For the
case of (ηC) = -0.5 the results show that the EV is between ( KD -0.033 million) and (KD
–0.33 million) with a mean (KD -0.2 million). For the case of (ηC) = -1.5 the results are
three times those of the former case, the EV is between ( KD -0.1 million) and (KD –
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million) with a mean (KD -0.6 million). These welfare losses are relatively low compared
to the magnitude of GDP, which averaged (KD 5052 millions) during the

YEAR

EV
ηC = -0.5

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0.04
-0.07
-0.08
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3

YEAR
ηC = -1.5

EV
ηC = -0.5

-0.09
-0.09
-0.09
-0.1
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.3

ηC = -1.5

-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9

Table (8): EV (million KDs)
sample period. There are two sources for the low welfare losses. First, the elasticity of
imports is relatively low compared to those of developed countries, which are generally
close to two. In addition, these estimates are for the short-term, however the long-term
elasticities are much greater. Second, the low tariff rate contributes the most to the low
welfare loss. To see the difference between the current tariff rate in Kuwait (4%) and the
average rate in developing countries (19.6%), the EV was re-estimated under the latter
rate. The average welfare loss, with (ηC = -1.5), has increased sharply from (KD -0.6
million) to (KD –11.7 million).
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(4.3.2) EV AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
This subsection estimates the welfare loss (EV) as a percentage of GDP using
equation (2). The results are presented in table (9). The table shows that the welfare loss
is very small as a percentage of GDP. For the case where (ηC = -0.5) the EV ranged
between (-0.002% and - 0.009%) with an average of (- 0.005%). For the case where (ηC =
-1.5) the EV ranged between (-0.006% and - 0.03%) with an average of (- 0.015%). As
stated in the previous subsection, these low welfare effects are attributed to the low
import elasticity and the low tariff rate. As in the previous subsection, the EV/GDP was
re-estimated under the average tariff rate in developing countries (19.6%), and it was
found that the average welfare loss, with (ηC = -1.5), has increased sharply from (0.015%) to (-0.3%).

YEAR

EV
ηC = -0.5

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.003
-0.005
-0.006
-0.006
-0.005
-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.007
-0.007

YEAR

ηC = -1.5

-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.009
-0.009
-0.015
-0.018
-0.018
-0.015
-0.018
-0.018
-0.018
-0.021
-0.021

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Table (9): EV as percentage of GDP
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EV
ηC = -0.5

ηC = -1.5

-0.005
-0.005
-0.004
-0.005
-0.005
-0.007
-0.009
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.006
-0.005

-0.015
-0.015
-0.016
-0.015
-0.015
-0.021
-0.027
-0.021
-0.018
-0.015
-0.018
-0.018
-0.018
-0.018
-0.015

CHAPTER (5)

SIMULATION

INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Each section is in turn divided
into three subsections. Each subsection analyzes the effects of a given WTO agreement
on demand and supply equations, balance of trade and welfare, respectively. First, section
(5.1) analyzes the effects of reducing import tariff rates by 25%. Second, section (5.2)
analyzes the effects of an increase in the world’s price of the importable good by 10%.
Third, section (5.3) analyzes the effects of a 10% reduction in the world’s price of the
importable good. Finally, section (5.4) analyzes the effects of reducing government
purchases of domestic output by 50% as a result of enforcing the agreement on
government procurements.
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(5.1) TARIFF REDUCTION AGREEMENT
Under the WTO agreement of tariff reduction, industrialized countries are
required to reduce their import tariffs by 36% over a ten year period, compared to a 25%
reduction over fifteen years by developing countries. However, many countries reduced
their tariffs immediately after the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994. For example,
developing countries have reduced their tariffs, on average, by 25%. This study
hypothesizes the case of a 25% reduction in tariffs by Kuwait for the period 1995-99.

(5.1.1) EFFECTS ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The effects of the tariff reduction on supply and demand were calculated using
simulation procedure utilizing the parameters estimated in chapter four (section 4.1). In
the simulation exercise, domestic prices were specified under a 3% tariff rate for the
1995-99 period and a 4% rate for the period 1969-94. The effects of this agreement were
calculated as the difference between the simulated values under the current tariff rate
and the simulated values under the new rate. The effects on supply and demand for the
period 1995-99 are presented in table (10).
The results show that the reduction in tariffs, as expected, has a minor effect on
supply and demand since it corresponds to only about 1% decline in price. Consumption
(CY) increased for the period 1995-9 by (KD 53 million) or (0.9%), while production
(QY) declined by (KD 4 million) or (0.15%). The rise in (CY) and the decline in (QY) in
response to the decline in price are consistent with the laws of demand and supply which
dictate negative and positive relationships between price and quantity, respectively.
Demand for labor (LY) has declined slightly by (730 employees) or (0.27%) and demand

97

for capital (KY) declined by (KD 3.4 million) or (0.34%). Both effects are in the same
direction of the decline in output (QY), but demand for capital is more elastic than
demand for labor. The relatively lower decline in (LY) can be attributed to institutional
restrictions that prevent firms from laying off employees in the case of a decline in
production. Such restrictions may include skill specificity and long term labor contracts.

All numbers in millions of KDs except LX and LY in thousands of employees
QY
LY
KY
CX
QX
YEAR
CY

LX

KX

1995

10.4

-1.1

-0.1

-0.6

0.4

2.0

0.00

0.1

1996

10.8

-1.0

-0.1

-0.6

0.5

2.0

0.00

0.1

1997

11.3

-1.1

-0.1

-0.7

0.4

1.9

0.00

0.1

1998

11.1

-1.1

-0.2

-0.7

0.2

3.3

0.00

0.1

1999

19.6

-0.9

-0.2

-0.7

0.3

3.2

0.00

1.0

TOTAL
Million KDs
Percent (%)

53.1
0.9

-4.2
-0.15

-0.73
-0.27

-3.4
-0.34

1.9
1.37

12.4
0.5

0.00
0.02

0.45
0.03

Table (10): Effect on Supply and Demand
The effects on the sector producing good (X) are generally smaller than those of
sector (Y). The demand for capital (KX) increased by (KD 0.4 million) or (0.03%). This
increase is clearly much smaller than the decline in the demand for capital in sector (Y),
which means that there will be excess supply of capital in the economy. Supply (QX)
increased by (KD 12.4 million) or (0.5%). Demand for labor (LX) increased slightly by
(0.02%), which is less than the decline in (LY), this mean that there will be excess supply
of labor in the economy. Finally, the demand (CX) has increased by (KD 1.9 million) or
(1.4%). Theoretically, the effect on the consumption of (X) depends on the relative
magnitudes of the income and substitution effects and on which one will dominate the
other. The decline in the price of good (Y), which accounts for about 96% of the total
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expenditure by the household, has a positive income effect because it increases the
household’s income. By contrast, the decline in the price of good (Y) makes good (X)
relatively more expensive, therefore consumption of good (X) has to decrease.
Empirically, the increase in (CX) implies that the income effect dominates the substitution
effect. That is, consumers are richer as a result of the decline in the price of good (Y).

(5.1.2) EFFECTS ON BALANCE OF TRADE
This subsection analyzes the effects of the tariff reduction agreement on the
balance of trade. Exports and imports are calculated as the difference between
consumption and production in each sector (see subsection 3.1.4 for details). Simulation
results are presented below in table (11). First, imports of good Y (IMY) have increased
by (KD 58.3 million) or (1.4%) because production (QY) has declined, while
consumption (CY) has increased. This increased the excess demand in the economy, as a
result imports had to increase. Second, exports (EXX) have increased by (KD 10.5
million) or (1.9%) because production (QX) has increased by more than the increase in
consumption (CX). As a result, the excess supply of good (X) in the domestic market has
increased, therefore exports increased. Finally, the balance of trade (TB) has declined by
(KD 47.8 million) as a result of the higher increase in imports than the increase in
exports. This result is expected from the point of view of international trade theory. The
reason is that import tariffs protect the industry producing the importable good from
international competition by making foreign made goods more expensive. This induces
domestic producers to divert economic resources to the protected industry, away from the
exportable good industry. However, a reduction in protection (i.e. cuts in tariffs) makes
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the importable sector less profitable and, therefore, economic resources move back to the
exportable good sector. As a result, output contracts in the importable sector and imports
have to increase to fill the gap in excess demand. On the other hand, output and exports
in the exportable sector increases as well. This result is consistent with Lerner’s Theorem
which states that import tariffs have a similar effect to export taxes, therefore a reduction
in tariffs should increase imports and exports.

All numbers in millions of KDs
YEAR
IMY

EXX

TB

1995

11.5

1.6

-9.9

1996

11.8

1.5

-10.3

1997

12.4

1.4

-11.0

1998

12.1

3.0

-9.1

1999

10.5

2.9

-2.9

TOTAL
Million KDs
Percent (%)

58.3
1.4

10.5
1.9

-47.8

Table (11): Effect on Trade Balance
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(5.1.3) EFFECTS ON WELFARE
In this subsection, the effects of the tariff cut on welfare are measured and
analyzed. The tool that is used is the compensating change in utility measure that was
derived in section (3.3.1). This measure is estimated both in millions of KDs (equation
7):
Eu du = – IM P* (dP*/P*) + τ ηC P* IM (dP/P)
and as a percentage of GDP (equation 7’):
Eu du / R = – Ω (dP*/P* ) + Ω τ ηC (dP/ P)
As in chapter four, welfare effect is measured under two values of the import’s
price elasticity (ηC): -0.5 and -1.5. The results are presented in table (12) for both welfare
effects in terms of money and as a percentage of GDP. The table shows that the total
welfare gain of the tariff reduction agreement for the 1995-99 period is negligible. This
result was expected since the tariff cut reduces prices by about only one percent
(0.96%).The gain increases at an increasing rate in the first three years (1995-97), then at
a decreasing rate in the last two years (1998-1999). This is because the adjustment in the
behavior of consumers and producers to the new environment takes some time.
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YEAR

Welfare Effect
KD million
% of GDP
C
C
C
η = -0.5
η = -1.5
η = -0.5
ηC = -1.5

1995

0.12

0.36

0.002

0.007

1996

0.12

0.37

0.002

0.007

1997

0.11

0.33

0.003

0.008

1998

0.1

0.3

0.003

0.008

1999

0.07

0.23

0.002

0.006

TOTAL

0.53

1.6

0.002

0.006

Table (12): Effect on Welfare
In terms of money, the total welfare gain is (KD 0.53 million) and (KD 1.6
million) for values of (ηC) equal -0.5 and -1.5, respectively. As a percentage of GDP, the
annual welfare gain is between (0.002%) and (0.003%) for the inelastic demand for
imports and between (0.006%) and (0.008%) for the elastic demand case. These results
suggest that the Tariff Reduction Agreement has a minor welfare gain to the Kuwaiti
economy, so not much should be expected to be gained, at least, in the short run. In the
long run, however, these gains may be higher since the long run compensated price
elasticity of imports is much larger than the short run elasticity, which was used here.
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(5.2) ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT
As stated in chapter three (section 3.4), the enforcement of this agreement may
result in an increase in prices of imports of good (Y) if dumping by foreign suppliers in
the Kuwaiti market could be eliminated. This study analyzes the effects of a hypothetical
case in which import prices rise by 10%. The effects were measured using the parameters
that were estimated in section (4.1). It is assumed that a 10% increase in import prices has
taken place during the 1995-99 period, while prices were kept unchanged for the 1969-94
period.

(5.2.1) EFFECTS ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The effects on supply and demand are presented in table (13). The results show
that this agreement has larger effects than those of the tariff reduction agreement since
the change in prices is ten times that of the latter agreement. Consumption of good (Y)
declined by (KD 498 million) or (8.8%), while production increased by (KD 52.2
million) or (1.9%). This shows that this agreement has different effects on consumers and
producers. Consumers have decreased their consumption during the 1995-99 period
relative to the baseline (i.e. w/o the agreement) case. Producers, however, enjoy a gain
(i.e. higher profits) because the increase in the price was accompanied by an increase in
production. The effects on supply and demand are consistent with the laws of supply and
demand.
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All numbers in millions of KDs except LX and LY in thousands of employees
QY
LY
KY
CX
QX
YEAR
CY

LX

KX

1995

-97.5

10.7

1.4

7.0

-3.5

-18.0

-0.01

-0.9

1996

-101.0

10.4

1.4

7.0

-5.0

-18.3

-0.01

-0.9

1997

-106.0

11.0

1.4

7.2

-3.9

-16.9

-0.01

-0.9

1998

-103.9

10.4

1.5

7.5

-2.3

-29.5

-0.01

-0.9

1999

-89.7

9.6

1.5

7.6

-2.6

-28.6

-0.01

-0.9

TOTAL
Million KDs
Percent (%)

-498
-8.8

52.2
1.9

7.4
2.7

36.3
3.7

-17.3
-12.6

-111.3
-4.6

-0.04
-0.2

-4.4
-0.4

Table (13):Effect on Demand and Supply

The demand for capital (KY) increased by (KD 36.3 million) or (3.7%) and the
demand for labor (LY) increased by (7350 employees) or (2.7%). These two results are
consistent with the increase in output. Moreover, the relatively lower increase in demand
for labor confirms the observation that the demand for labor is relatively inelastic.
Finally, the effects on the (X) industry are also more significant under this
agreement than under the tariff cut agreement. Consumption (CX) declined by ( KD 17.3
million) or (12.6%). The decline in (CX) implies that the income effect dominates the
substitution effect. That is, consumers are poorer as a result of the rise in the price of
good (Y). Production (QX) declined as well by (KD 111.3 million) or (15.5%) because
the increase in the price of good (Y) has increased output (QY), which diverted factors of
production from producing good (X) to producing good (Y). Demand for labor (LX)
declined slightly by (0.02%) and demand for capital (KX) decreased by (KD 4.4 million)
or (0.3%). This shows that demand for capital is more elastic than demand for labor
because the (X) industry as in the (Y) industry. The decline in both demand for capital
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and labor is consistent with the decline in output and the increase in demand for factors of
production in the (Y) industry. Note that the increase in demand for factors of production
in the (Y) industry exceeds the decline in demand for factors in the (X) industry, this
creates excess demand for the two factors in the economy.
(5.2.2) EFFECTS ON BALANCE OF TRADE
This subsection analyzes the effects of the antidumping agreement on the balance
of trade. Simulation results are presented in table (14) below. First, imports of good Y
(IMY) decreased by (KD 550.3 million) or (13.3%) because the decline in consumption
(CY) was accompanied by an increase in production (QY). This resulted in a decline in the
excess demand in the economy. As a result, imports have decreased. Second, exports
(EXX) decreased by (KD 94 million) or (17.5%) because the decline in output (QX) was
by far greater than the decline in consumption (CX). As a result, the excess supply in the
economy has decreased and exports decreased as well. Finally, the balance of trade (TB)
increased by (KD 456.3 million) as a result of the relatively larger decline in imports to
the decline in exports.
All numbers in millions of KDs
YEAR
IMY

EXX

TB

1995

-108.3

-14.5

93.8

1996

-111.5

-13.3

98.2

1997

-116.9

-13.0

103.9

1998

-114.3

-27.3

87.0

1999
TOTAL

-99.3

-26.0

73.3

Million KDs
Percent (%)

-550.3
-13.3

-94.1
-17.5

456.3

Table (14): Effect on Trade Balance

105

(5.2.3) EFFECTS ON WELFARE
In this subsection, the effects of the increase in the price of (Y) on welfare are
measured and analyzed. The tool that was used is the same as that of the previous section,
namely, the compensating change in utility measure. This measure is estimated both in
millions of KDs and as a percentage of GDP.
The welfare loss estimates are presented in table (15). The results show a
relatively significant effect of the Antidumping Agreement on the economy of Kuwait.
The reason is that the agreement will, hypothetically, increase import prices (domestic
prices as well) by ten percent during the period in which it is implemented.

YEAR

Welfare Effect
KD million
% of GDP
C
C
C
η = -0.5
η = -1.5
η = -0.5
ηC = -1.5

1995

-84.4

-87.7

-0.02

-0.08

1996

-86.9

-90.4

-0.02

-0.08

1997

-78.5

-81.5

-0.03

-0.08

1998

-70.9

-73.7

-0.03

-0.08

1999

-53.8

-55.9

-0.02

-0.06

TOTAL

-374.5

-389.2

-1.47

-1.55

Table (15): Effect on Welfare
In terms of money, the total welfare loss is (KD 374.5 million) and (KD 389.2
million) for values of (ηC) equal -0.5 and -1.5, respectively. As a percentage of GDP, the
annual welfare loss is between (0.02%) and (0.03%) for the inelastic demand for imports
and between (0.06%) and (0.08%) for the elastic demand case. This loss may even
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increase more in the long run, since the long run compensated price elasticity of imports
is much larger than the short run elasticity, which was used here.
These estimates of the welfare loss suggest that the private sector has to play a
role in reducing this loss because it is the main beneficiary of enforcing this agreement.
For example, it should increase its capacity in the early stages of implementing the
agreement in order to reduce the dependency on imports. This was shown to take place
(see section 5.2.1) when domestic output of good (Y) was increased during the
enforcement period, which resulted in a decline in imports.
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(5.3) DECLINE IN WORLD PRICES
This subsection provides measures of the effects of a hypothetical 10% decline in
world prices of good (Y) as a result of implementing all of the WTO agreements, which
are expected to lower the costs of production and smooth trade (see section 3.4 for more
details). This was done by using the simulation procedure assuming a 10% decrease in
import prices for the 1995-99 period, while keeping prices unchanged for the period
1969-94.

(5.3.1) EFFECTS ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The effects on demand and supply are presented in table (16). The results show
that the decrease in the price of (Y) has the opposite effects to the price increase with
close magnitudes. Consumption of good (Y) rose by (KD 606.6 million) or (10.7%),
while production declined by (KD 56.6 million) or (2.1%). Both effects are consistent
with the laws of demand and supply, respectively.
All numbers in millions of KDs except LX and LY in thousands of employees

YEAR

CY

QY

LY

KY

CX

QX

LX

KX

1995

118.8

-11.7

-1.5

-7.4

4.5

23.8

0.01

1.0

1996

123.1

-11.3

-1.6

-7.4

6.4

24.1

0.01

1.0

1997

1129.1

-11.9

-1.6

-7.6

5.0

22.3

0.01

1.0

1998

126.5

-11.3

-1.6

-7.9

2.9

39.0

0.01

1.0

1999

1109.2

-10.4

-1.6

-8.0

3.3

37.7

0.01

1.0

TOTAL
Million KDs
Percent (%)

606.6
10.7

-56.6
-2.1

-7.9
-2.9

-38.3
-3.9

22.0
16.1

147
6.1

0.04
0.20

4.9
0.38

Table (16):Effect on Demand and Supply
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Demand for labor (LY) declined by (7,900 employees) or (2.9%) and demand for
capital (KY) declined as well by (KD 38.3 million) or (3.9%). These two results are
consistent with the decline in output. Moreover, the relatively higher decrease in demand
for capital confirms the observation that labor is relatively inelastic.
Finally, the effect on sector (X) is of a close magnitude and opposite direction to
that of the price increase. Consumption (CX) has increased by (KD 22 million) or (16%).
The increase in (CX) implies that the income effect dominates the substitution effect. That
is, the decline in the price of good (Y) has made the household richer, thus it could afford
consuming more of good (X). Production (QX) increased by (KD 147 million) or (6.1%).
Demand for labor (LX) increased slightly by (40 employees) or (0.2%). Demand for
capital (KX) increased by (KD 4.9 million) or (0.4%). Again, this shows that demand for
capital is more elastic than demand for labor. The rise in both the demand for capital and
the demand for labor is consistent with the rise in output (QX) and the decline in demand
for factors of production in the (Y) industry.

(5.3.2) EFFECTS ON BALANCE OF TRADE
This subsection discusses the effects of the reduction in the world’s price of good

(Y) on the balance of trade. Simulation results are presented in table (17) below. First,
imports of good Y (IMY) increased by (KD 663.3 million) or (16%) because of the
increase in the excess demand in the economy, as a result of the increase in consumption
(CY) and the decline in production (QY). Second, exports (EXX) increased by (KD 164.2
million) or (30.6%) because production (QX) increased by more than the increase in
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consumption (CX). Finally, the balance of trade (TB) decreased by (KD 499.1 million) as
a result of the increase in imports and the decline in exports.

All numbers in millions of KDs

YEAR

IMY

EXX

TB

1995

130.4

27.3

-103.1

1996

134.4

29.1

-105.3

1997

141.0

26.2

-114.8

1998

137.8

41.3

-96.5

1999
TOTAL
Million KDs
Percent (%)

119.7

40.3

-79.4

663.3
16.0

164.2
30.6

-499.1

Table (17): Effect on Trade Balance
(5.3.3) EFFECTS ON WELFARE
This subsection measures and discusses the effects of the decline in the world’s
price of good (Y) on welfare. The same tool that was used in the previous sections is used
here.
The welfare gain estimates are presented in table (18). The results show a
relatively significant effect of the decline in world prices on the Kuwaiti economy. The
reason is that the agreement will, hypothetically, reduce import prices (domestic prices as
well) by ten percent during the period in which WTO agreements are enforced. In terms
of money, the total welfare gain is (KD 374.5 million) and (KD 389.2 million) for values
of (ηC) equal -0.5 and -1.5, respectively. As a percentage of GDP, the annual welfare
gain is between (0.02%) and (0.03%) for the inelastic demand for imports and between
(0.06%) and (0.08%) for the elastic demand case. This gain may even increase more in
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the long run since the long run compensated price elasticity of imports is much larger
than the short run elasticity, which was used here.
The main source of this gain, as shown in section (5.3.1), comes from the increase
in consumption of both the importable (because of the increase in imports) and the
exportable goods. These results encourage all countries to join the WTO, which
potentially will improve the world’s welfare, ceteris paribus. This of course shows that
some countries can “free ride” or take advantage of the improvement in the world welfare
as a result of the enforcement of the WTO agreements, without becoming members.

YEAR

Welfare Effect
KD million
% of GDP
C
C
C
η = -0.5
η = -1.5
η = -0.5
ηC = -1.5

1995

84.4

87.7

0.02

0.08

1996

86.9

90.4

0.02

0.08

1997

78.5

81.5

0.03

0.08

1998

70.9

73.7

0.03

0.08

1999

53.8

55.9

0.02

0.06

TOTAL

374.5

389.2

1.47

1.55

Table (18): Effect on Welfare
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(5.4) GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT
This subsection hypothesizes the effects of implementing the Government
Procurement Agreement, which prohibits governments from discriminating against
foreign suppliers. Here it is assumed that 50% of the government’s purchases of goods (X
and Y) are in excess of what it needs, just to support domestic producers. This makes
these purchases subject to the rules of the government procurement agreement.
As mentioned in chapter three (section 3.4), only exports of good (X) are affected
by this agreement; there is no effect on supply and demand. The results show that exports
will increase by (KD 22.6 million) or (4.1%) as a result of implementing this agreement,
ceteris paribus. As a result, the balance of trade increased by the same amount since
imports haven’t changed.

All numbers in millions of KDs
YEAR

EXX

TB

1995

4.2

4.2

1996

4.1

4.1

1997

4.2

4.2

1998

4.9

4.9

1999
TOTAL
Million KDs
Percent (%)

5.2

5.2

22.6
4.1

22.6
4.1

Table (19): Effect on Trade Balance
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CHAPTER (6)

CONCLUSIONS

(6.1) EXTENSIONS
This study can be extended in a number of directions to get more insights of the
possible effects of the WTO on the economy of Kuwait. First, the assumptions of perfect
competition and constant returns to scale may be replaced by assumptions of imperfect
competition and economies of scale. It would be interesting to see how the results will
change under these new assumptions, especially since previous studies have shown that
these new assumptions double or triple the estimates of the gains from the WTO
agreements. Second, a different model may be used to obtain new estimates that can be
compared to the estimates obtained in this study. For example, a partial equilibrium
model may be used to obtain estimates of gains or losses of a certain sector (s) of the
economy as a result of enforcing a given agreement (s). Third, the model may be used to
get estimates of the effects of the WTO on other sectors of the economy and other import
categories. For example, we may look at the effects of trade liberalization agreements on
imports of food, capital goods and crude materials; or on exports of oil, which is still
outside the scope of the WTO agreements. Finally, the model can be used to get estimates
of the WTO on a group of countries in which Kuwait is a member. For example, it may
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be appropriate to use panel data for country members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) or members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

(6.2) SUMMARY
The major contribution of this study was quantifying the economic impact of
Kuwait’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The study has provided
quantitative measures of the effects on supply, demand, welfare and terms of trade of
Kuwait. The significance of this study comes from being the first study to quantify the
effects on Kuwait since joining the WTO.
A general equilibrium international trade model was used to obtain the
quantitative results. The model is theoretically static and based on the assumptions of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. However, it was estimated dynamically
by including a lagged dependent variable in each estimated equation and it was simulated
dynamically as well. The model describes the behavior of three representative economic
agents in a small open economy. The model emphasizes the effects of the WTO
agreements on trade in two bundles of manufactured goods that are produced by the
representative firm. The first is an importable good which corresponds to a bundle of
manufactured goods (excludes capital goods, crude materials and agricultural products).
The second is an exportable good that represents a bundle of chemical goods. The
government produces public services that are consumed domestically and oil that is
exported to the foreign country.
After specifying the model theoretically, it was estimated empirically using
annual real data for the period between 1969 and 1999. This study has linearized the
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supply and demand equations that were obtained from solving the optimization problems
of the household and the firm, then it used econometric techniques to estimate the model.
This is in contrast with other studies that usually solve general equilibrium models
numerically, because they are nonlinear and complicated, using a technique known as
“calibration.” The main objective of estimating the model was to provide a quantitative
measure of the WTO agreements on the Kuwaiti economy. The estimated model was
used in a number of simulation exercises, in each one a given agreement was analyzed
and economic effects were measured.
The simulation exercises gave a number of results that are summarized in tables
(21 and 22). Below is a discussion of the effects on good (Y) only since it was affected
by the WTO agreements that were analyzed. First, the agreement on tariff reduction has a
very small effect on Kuwait because tariff rates are already low, making any reductions
have insignificant effects. The results are as follows: Consumption of the importable
good increased by 0.9 %, its production declined by 0.15 %, its imports increased by 1.4
% and the welfare gain was between 0.002% and 0.006% (depending on the elasticity of
imports). Second, the antidumping agreement has a larger effect since it corresponds
hypothetically to a 10% increase in the price of the importable good. The results are as
follows: Consumption of the importable good declined by 8.8 %, its production increased
by 1.9 %, its imports declined by 13.3 % and the welfare loss was between 1.47% and
1.55%. Third, the decline in the world’s price of the importable good as a result of
implementing the WTO agreements globally, has significant effects on the economy. The
results are as follows: Consumption of the importable good increased by 10.7 %, its
production declined by 2.1 %, its imports increased by 16 % and the welfare gain was
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between 1.47% and 1.55%. Finally, the agreement on government procurement has the
least effects since it affects only exports of the exportable good, which increased by 4.1
%.
All numbers are in percentage rates

Case

CY

QY

LY

KY

CX

QX

LX

KX

Tariff
Reduction

0.94

-0.15

-0.27

-0.34

1.37

0.5

0.02

0.04

Antidumping

-8.8

1.86

2.7

3.7

-12.6

-4.6

-0.2

-0.34

Decline
In Prices

10.7

-2.1

-2.9

-3.9

16.1

6.1

0.2

0.38

Government
Procurement

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Table (20): Summary of Effects on Supply and Demand.

All numbers are in percentage rates

Case

IMY

EXX

Tariff
Reduction

1.4

1.9

Antidumping

-13.3

-17.5

Decline
In Prices

16.0

30.6

Government
Procurement

0

4.1

Table (21): Summary of Effects on Imports and Exports.
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(6.3) Conclusions
The results obtained in this study have a number of features that can be used to
draw a number of conclusions. First, each agreement has different effects than other
agreements in terms of the direction of effects (i.e. positive vs. negative) and their
magnitudes. Second, each agreement affects economic agents (i.e. households and firms)
in opposite directions. For example, an increase in the prices hurts consumers but benefits
producers. Third, from the above points, it is clear that no general (uniform) conclusions
can be drawn regarding the effects of the agreements of the WTO as a whole. Instead, the
agreements have to be evaluated on individual agreement basis and, specifically, on the
basis of individual economic agents. Fourth, even producers are affected differently in the
two sectors (i.e. X and Y) under each agreement, which makes it more difficult to draw
general conclusions. Fifth, exports and imports tend to move in the same direction but at
different magnitudes. Finally, the relatively low estimates obtained in this study may be
contributed to the restrictive assumptions of the model such as perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. It is clear that relaxing these assumptions may significantly
increase the estimates (Francois et al, 1994).
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APPENDIX (1)

GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS
In the graph below (from Corden, 1971, p. 67 ), a small country is trading in two
goods X (exportable) and Y (importable). The graph was used by Corden to show the
effect of imposing an import tariff on Y beginning from a free trade case. However, since
our goal in this study is to examine the effects of reducing tariffs on the terms of trade
and welfare of the home country, the graph is used inversely. That is, beginning from a
case of import tariffs and move to a case of reducing tariffs.
First, the production possibility curve is drawn, using factor endowments and
production functions, and labeled as HH’. Second, the tariff distorted price ratio is
labeled as GG’. Thus, production is determined at point P’ where HH’ tangents GG’.
Third, the income-consumption line, associated with the price ratio GG’, is 0Z’.
Consumption point is determined as follows. The country can trade along the line JP’J’
which is parallel to the tariff free price ratio line SS’. Consumption must be on the 0Z’
line, therefore, consumption point must be at the intersection of lines JP’J’ and 0Z’ at
point C’. To determine imports, exports and tariff revenues, draw line LL’ parallel to
GG’ (the difference between them is the recycled tariff revenue) and passes through C’.
Consumption of Y is D’C’ of which D’D is produced domestically and DC’ is imported.
Production of X is 0K’ of which 0D’ is domestically consumed while D’K’ is exported.
The trade triangle, under the tariff, is DP’C’. Finally, the tariff revenue is P’E which is
returned to the households’ as transfers.
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Next, we consider the case when import tariffs by the home country are reduced
(or eliminated). First, the reduction in tariff rate on (Y) increases the relative price ratio
(terms of trade) which rotates the relative price curve which becomes steeper, SS’. As a
result, the tangency (production) point becomes P and the income-consumption curve
becomes steeper, 0Z. Second, the intersection (consumption) point between SS’ and 0Z is
now higher and to the left of C’. This implies that the consumption of Y has increased
and the consumption of X has decreased. Third, the new trade triangle is now CBP,
which is much greater than the previous trade triangle with higher tariffs. Exports of X
increased to BP, while imports of Y increased to BC.
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APPENDIX (2)

Deriving The Compensated Price Elasticity of Imports

The Slutsky equations is defined as follows:
∂ IMU / ∂ P = ∂ IMC / ∂ P – IM ∂ IMU / ∂ R
Multiply both sides by P/IM to obtain elasticities,
∂ IMU / ∂ P P/IM = ∂ IMC / ∂ P P/IM – IM ∂ IMU / ∂ R P/IM
ηU = ηC - IM ∂ IMU / ∂ R P/IM
Multiply the second term on the right hand side by IM/R and R/IM
ηU = ηC - ηR P IM / R
Define Ψ = P IM / M as the share of imports in total income
ηU = ηC - Ψ ηR
Solve for the compensated elasticity of demand for imports,
ηC = ηU + Ψ ηR
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APPENDIX (3)

Table (22) GATT Rounds and Volume of Trade Covered ($ billion)

Number of
Countries

Value of Trade
Covered ($ bn)

Round

Dates

Geneva

1947

23

10

Annecy

1949

33

NA

Torquay

1950

34

NA

Geneva

1956

22

2.5

Dillon

1960-61

45

4.9

Kennedy

1962-67

48

40

Tokyo

1973-79

99

155

Uruguay

1986-94

120

3,700

Source: Jackson (1998).
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APPENDIX (4)
Table (23) WTO Agreements

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX (1)
ANNEX 1A Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
ANNEX 1B General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
ANNEX 1C Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
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Table (23)…Continue
ANNEX (2)
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX (3)
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
ANNEX (4)
Plurilateral Trade Agreements
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
Agreement on Government Procurement
International Dairy Agreement
International Bovine Meat Agreement
Source: WTO: The Legal Text (1999)
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APPENDIX (5)
Table (24) Survey of Time-Series Studies in LDCs
Author

Country

Year

Number of Observations

Agarwala

India

1970

14

Carter

Jamaica

1970

8

Indonesia

1984

22

Nicaragua

1979

15

Neyanathan

Malaysia

1984

16

Lin and Chou

Hong Kong

1985

20

Marwah

Columbia

1969

12

Rijckeghem

Argentina

1968

16

Paul

Guyana

1975

22

1975

12

1964

9

Central Bureau
Statistics
Downing and
Solis
Imaoka and

Maynard and

Persad
Soonthornsima

Trinidad and Tobago
Thailand

Toida

Singapore

1984

16

UNCTAD

Nigeria

1973

12

Source: Khayum (1991)
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APPENDIX (6)
Table (25) Survey of Time-Series Studies of Kuwait
Author

Year

Number of Observations

Type of Study

Abdulghani

1991

28

Ph.D. Dissertation:
New York University

Algahtani

1992

32 (quarterly)

Journal Article

Alomar

2002

21

Ph.D. Dissertation:
Claremont Graduate
University

Crockett and Evans

1980

7

IMF Staff Paper

El Mallakh and
Atta

1981

16

Book

Fadil

1989

44 (quarterly)

Journal Article

Hegazey

1985

20

Ph.D. Dissertation:
University of Connecticut

Khoja and Sadler

1979

15

Book

Moosa

1986

24 (quarterly)

Working Paper

Perera

1994

44 (quarterly)

Journal Article

Sangarabalan

1984

18

Ph.D. Dissertation:
University of Surrey
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APPENDIX (7)
Table (26) Estimation of Supply and Demand: Baseline

Dependent Variable

PY

PX

L

K

T

EXOIL

Lag

QX

-1.8
(-3.2)

1.1
(3.4)

0.8
(1.4)

0.3
(0.8)

----

0.9
(6.2)

0.2
(0.1)

QY

0.2
(0.8)

0.2
(1.5)

-0.4
(-1.2)

0.6
(3.3)

----

0.2
(2.8)

0.1
(1.0)

CX

-1.4
(-1.4)

2.9
(6.5)

-4.9
(- 5.5)

2.9
(4.9)

-0.9
(-0.9)

----

0.01
(0.1)

CY

-0.9
(-1.6)

0.7
(3.1)

-0.8
(-2.4)

0.9
(3.8)

0.9
(2.3)

----

0.5
(3.1)

KX

-0.04
(-0.1)

-0.1
(-0.5)

-0.5
(-1.4)

1.1
(5.2)

----

-0.1
(-1.9)

0.5
(4.4)

KY

0.4
(1.1)

-0.4
(-2.5)

-0.1
(-0.2)

0.5
(2.1)

----

0.1
(0.8)

0.6
(3.3)

LX

-0.02
(-0.1)

0.3
(1.9)

-0.3
(-1.1)

0.4
(2.1)

----

0.03
(0.4)

0.7
(5.0)

LY

0.3
(1.1)

-0.01
(-0.1)

0.04
(0.1)

0.1
(0.9)

----

0.04
(0.8)

0.6
(2.8)

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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APPENDIX (8)
Table (27) Estimation of Supply and Demand: w/o T and EXOIL

Dependent Variable

PY

PX

L

K

Lag

QX

-1.2
(-1.3)

1.4
(3.3)

-2.6
(-3.2)

1.9
(3.2)

0.2
(1.0)

QY

0.05
(0.2)

0.3
(2.1)

-1.0
(-4.1)

0.9
(5.4)

0.3
(1.8)

CX

-1.8
(-2.0)

3.0
(6.8)

-4.6
(- 5.8)

2.8
(4.6)

0.05
(0.5)

CY

-0.2
(-0.5)

0.5
(2.7)

-1.1
(-4.0)

0.9
(4.2)

0.3
(2.4)

KX

-0.01
(-0.02)

-0.2
(-1.1)

-0.1
(-0.4)

0.9
(4.7)

0.5
(4.3)

KY

0.3
(0.9)

-0.3
(-2.4)

-0.3
(-1.1)

0.6
(2.8)

0.6
(3.4)

LX

-0.1
(-0.2)

0.3
(2.6)

-0.4
(-1.9)

0.5
(2.5)

0.7
(5.3)

LY

0.2
(0.9)

0.05
(0.6)

-0.1
(-0.5)

0.2
(1.8)

0.6
(3.1)

________________________________________________________________________
Note: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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